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Article
Not What, but When Is an Offer:
Rehabilitating the Rolling Contract
COLIN P. MARKS
A number of courts have held that a contract is formed when deferred
terms found inside the package are reviewed by the buyer and accepted by
some act—usually use of the good. This “rolling” contract approach has
been widely criticized by commentators as an abomination of contract law
that ignores a true application of the U.C.C., as well as the spirit of that
code. However, the approach is not without its allure, as it permits
contracts to be formed in an efficient manner that may very well appeal to
consumers. Yet too strict of an adherence to the approach threatens to
impose terms upon parties that they never expected or agreed upon; but
conversely, too strict of an adherence to traditional concepts of offer and
acceptance threatens to displace terms that were contemplated and not
objectionable. Though existing contract law does a good job of defining
contract offer, the trickier issue is identifying when the offer is actually
made. If parties to a contract know that there is more to the contract than
simply the price and the good, then it should come as no surprise that more
terms are to come, or that a more detailed offer will be forthcoming. Thus,
in some scenarios, it is perfectly reasonable to assume that the contract
has not been formed in-store, but rather a deferred offer will come later.
Thus rolling contract theory can be explained under a legal realism
approach, as influenced by relational contract theory; however, this is not
to say that all contracts are now subject to the rolling contract approach.
This Article describes how legal realism and relational contract theory can
be used to explain the rolling contract approach and makes suggestions for
how relational contract theory can be used to aid courts in determining
which
contracts
involve
a
rolling
or
deferred
offer.
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Not What, but When Is an Offer:
Rehabilitating the Rolling Contract
COLIN P. MARKS∗
I. INTRODUCTION
A man walks into a bar and grill. No, this is not the beginning of a
joke (though you may find the end of the hypothetical comical). This is
the beginning of a contract. The man browses the bar’s menu and decides
to purchase the club sandwich. As he is in a hurry, he gets it to go. He
pays cash for the sandwich, which is handed to him in a bag. When he
finally settles down to eat the sandwich, he discovers that the cellophane
covering the sandwich has a seal that states:
This sandwich is sold as-is. Any and all disputes arising out
of the purchase of this sandwich are subject to binding
arbitration. By eating this sandwich, you agree to the terms
of this agreement. If you do not agree to the terms, you must
return the sandwich to the seller within twenty-four hours of
sale, and you will receive a full refund.
The man muses briefly over the implications of this statement and then,
overcome with hunger, eats the sandwich. If the man gets sick from food
poisoning, is he bound by the terms of this agreement?
∗
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The hypothetical is clearly fantasy, but it raises, albeit in a different
context, a very typical contract problem. To what degree are “rolling” or
“layered” contracts binding? Many courts have held that, with regard to
the sale of goods, a contract is not formed in the store or over the phone,
but at some later point.2 The typical scenario involves a good, such as a
1
Indeed, it is an intentional hyperbole. As Professor Richard Epstein has noted, “It is not as
though the green grocer is determined to contract out of a warranty of merchantable quality.” Richard
A. Epstein, ProCD v. Zeidenberg: Do Doctrine and Function Mix?, in CONTRACTS STORIES 94, 109
(Douglas G. Baird ed., 2007). The hypothetical does serve a useful purpose in this Article, however, as
it draws out the distinction between as-if-discrete contracts and more complex contracts that
contemplate an ongoing relationship. Furthermore, the hypothetical may not be as far-fetched as it
seems. In a blog post on Contracts Prof Blog, a sign from a Texas burger franchise’s door is displayed
which reads:

Arbitration Notice
By entering these premises, you hereby agree to resolve any and all disputes or
claims of any kind whatsoever, which arise from the products, services or premises,
by way of binding arbitration, not litigation. No suit or action may be filed in any
state or federal court. Any arbitration shall be governed by the FEDERAL
ARBITRATION ACT, and administered by the American Mediation Association.
Arbitration Notice
Kprofs2013, The Gates of Hell[ish Mandatory Arbitration]?, CONTRACTS PROF BLOG
(Jan. 11, 2011), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/contractsprof_blog/2011/01/the-gates-of-hellishmandatory-arbitration.html (many thanks to Dan Barnhizer for reminding me of this link). Some
online merchants also seem to try to disclaim warranties with clauses that, to my knowledge,
have not yet appeared in stores.
See, e.g., Terms & Conditions, TARGET.COM,
http://www.target.com/spot/terms-conditions#?lnk=fnav_t_spc_2_4 (last visited Aug. 29, 2013)
(excluding all warranties, express or implied, for all merchandise offered on its website); Walmart.com
Terms of Use, WALMART.COM, http://help.walmart.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/8 (last visited Aug. 29,
2013) (same).
2
See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 428 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that a
consumer manifests assent to terms included in the shrinkwrap encasing a product not at the point of
purchase, but instead through later actions); Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir.
1997) (“[A] vendor may propose that a contract of sale be formed, not in the store (or over the phone)
with the payment of money or a general ‘send me the product,’ but after the customer has had a chance
to inspect both the item and the terms.”); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg (ProCD II), 86 F.3d 1447, 1452
(7th Cir. 1996) (recognizing that the vendor has the power to propose a contract where the buyer
accepts by use of the good after rendering payment for it, provided that there is an opportunity to read
the extended terms); Meridian Project Sys., Inc. v. Hardin Constr. Co., 426 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1107
(E.D. Cal. 2006) (recognizing that where a consumer had notice of an end user license agreement
(“EULA”) and an opportunity to return the software if he did not agree to the terms, the EULA was not
invalid simply because the consumer received it after purchasing software and opening the package);
Falbe v. Dell, Inc., No. 04-C-1425, 2004 WL 1588243, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2004) (deciding that a
computer purchaser manifested assent to terms and conditions inside the box by keeping the computer
for more than thirty days); I.Lan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 338 (D.
Mass. 2002) (“‘Money now, terms later’ is a practical way to form contracts.”); Brower v. Gateway
2000, Inc., 246 A.D.2d 246, 250 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (“That contract . . . was formed and acceptance
was manifested not when the order was placed but only with the retention of the merchandise beyond
the 30 days specified in the Agreement enclosed in the shipment of merchandise.”); DeFontes v. Dell,
Inc., 984 A.2d 1061, 1068 (R.I. 2009) (“[T]he modern trend seems to favor placing the power of
acceptance in the hands of the buyer after he or she receives goods containing a standard form
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computer, that is purchased in-store with no mention of additional terms or
conditions.3 When the buyer gets home and opens the packaging,
additional terms and conditions, such as arbitration clauses, forum
selection clauses, limitations on liability, and the like, are discovered.4 A
number of courts, starting with the now infamous case of ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg (ProCD II),5 have held that, rather than the contract for the sale
being completed in-store (or over the phone), these later terms are what
constitute the offer, which the buyer accepts by some act—usually use of
the good (or declining to return it).6 This approach, which has been called
the rolling contract, has been widely criticized by commentators as an
abomination of contract law that ignores a true application of the Uniform
Commercial Code (U.C.C.) as well as the spirit of that code.7 Despite the
statement of additional terms and conditions, provided the buyer retains the power to ‘accept or return’
the product.”).
3
See, e.g., Adams v. Dell Computer Corp., No. CIV A C-06-089, 2006 WL 2670969, at *1, *4
(S.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2006) (finding that terms delivered with a Dell computer formed a valid “right-ofreturn contract,” binding the customer to an arbitration clause even after Dell agreed to pick up the
computer and issue the customer a refund); cf. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148 (involving the purchase of a
computer over the telephone); Fiser v. Dell Computer Corp., 165 P.3d 328, 334 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007)
(holding that—where a consumer purchased a computer from a website with links to terms and
conditions, received two emails containing warnings to review terms and conditions, and received
written terms inside the computer box—“keeping the computer after receiving the written terms and
conditions constitutes acceptance of the terms”), rev’d on other grounds, 188 P.3d 1215 (N.M. 2008).
4
See, e.g., Sherr v. Dell, Inc., No. 05 CV 10097(GBD), 2006 WL 2109436, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July
27, 2006) (“In order to avoid ineffectual, costly steps, it is not practical to expect salespeople to read
legal documents to customers before ringing up sales. Due to this reality, some clauses received even
after the initial transactions are enforceable.” (citation omitted)); Mudd-Lyman Sales & Serv. Corp. v.
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 236 F. Supp. 2d 907, 911 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (finding that a customer accepted
terms, including limitations of liability, by breaking a shrinkwrap seal that enclosed a CD-ROM and by
clicking “yes” to accept all of the terms prior to installation of the software); Moore v. Microsoft Corp.,
293 A.D.2d 587, 587 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (“[T]he defendant offered a contract that the plaintiff
accepted by using the software after having an opportunity to read the license at leisure. As a result,
the plaintiff’s claims are barred by the clear disclaimers, waivers of liability, and limitations of
remedies contained in the EULA.”).
5
86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
6
See, e.g., Ariz. Cartridge Remfrs. Ass’n v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 421 F.3d 981, 987–88 (9th Cir.
2005) (concluding that because ink cartridge purchasers had notice of restrictions on use and a chance
to reject such restrictions “before opening the clearly marked cartridge container,” the consumer
accepted the terms by opening the cartridge box); ProCD II, 86 F.3d at 1451 (“Notice on the outside,
terms on the inside, and a right to return the software for a refund if the terms are unacceptable (a right
that the license expressly extends), may be a means of doing business valuable to buyers and sellers
alike.”); M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 970 P.2d 803, 809 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999)
(“Does failure in such a case to elicit the customer’s express assent to the license terms before a
purchase order is issued make a contract ‘unfettered by terms—so the seller has made a broad warranty
and must pay consequential damages for any shortfalls in performance?’ We conclude that it does not
and hold that the terms of the present license agreement are part of the contract as formed between the
parties.” (citation omitted) (quoting ProCD II, 86 F.3d at 1452)), aff’d en banc, 998 P.2d 305 (Wash.
2000).
7
See Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1339 n.9 (D. Kan. 2000) (citing a lengthy
list of critical commentary regarding rolling contract theory); see also Roger C. Bern, “Terms Later”
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criticism, however, the rolling contract theory seems to have taken hold in
a number of jurisdictions.8 The approach is not without its allure, as it
permits contracts to be formed in an efficient manner that may very well
appeal to consumers and merchants alike. However, too strict of an
adherence to the approach threatens to impose terms upon parties that they
never expected or agreed upon. But the opposite is also true—too strict of
an adherence to traditional roles of offer and acceptance threatens to
Contracting: Bad Economics, Bad Morals, and a Bad Idea for a Uniform Law, Judge Easterbrook
Notwithstanding, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 641, 642–43 (2004) (“[ProCD II] and its initial progeny, Hill v.
Gateway 2000, Inc., however, have been deservedly and widely criticized, variously described as a
‘swashbuckling tour de force that dangerously misinterprets legislation and precedent,’ a ‘real howler’
that is ‘dead wrong’ on its interpretation of section 2-207 of the UCC, a decision that ‘flies in the face
of UCC policy and precedent,’ a ‘detour from traditional U.C.C. analysis’ ‘contrary to public policy,’
with analysis that ‘gets an ‘F’ as a law exam.’” (footnotes omitted)).
8
See Higgs v. Auto. Warranty Corp. of Am., 134 Fed. App’x. 828, 831 (6th Cir. 2005) (“The
‘accept-or-return’ mechanism to contract formation has been enforced by courts, including in contexts
involving the sale of products and services by mail and telephone, software licensing and sales, mobile
telephone service agreements, satellite television agreements, credit card agreements, and bank account
agreements.”); Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 430 (2d Cir. 2004) (recognizing rolling
contract theory, but also recognizing its limits, as “a party must be given some opportunity to reject or
assent to proposed terms and conditions prior to forming a contract”); ProCD II, 86 F.3d at 1452
(initiating the formal recognition of rolling contracts); RealPage, Inc. v. EPS, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 2d 539,
547 (E.D. Tex. 2007) (recognizing the holding in ProCD II, but distinguishing it based on the
indefiniteness of certain clickwrap license agreements); Sherr, 2006 WL 2109436, at *2 (recognizing
that “[a]pprove-or-return contracts have been found to be enforceable in consumer transactions,” and
thus “some clauses received even after the initial transactions are enforceable”); Meridian Project Sys.,
Inc. v. Hardin Constr. Co., 426 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1107 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (finding the rationale in
ProCD II “compelling”); Chandler v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 358 F. Supp. 2d 701, 704 (S.D. Ill.
2005) (“By using her phone rather than canceling immediately, or no later than thirty days after her
activation date, Chandler accepted the offered services and the terms and conditions under which they
were offered. She had a clear mechanism and reasonable opportunity to reject them.”); Bischoff v.
DirecTV, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1105 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (“The nature of the business in which
DirecTV engages is similar to that of the customers in Gateway and Carnival. Practical business
realities make it unrealistic to expect DirecTV, or any television programming service provider for that
matter, to negotiate all of the terms of their customer contracts, including arbitration provisions, with
each customer before initiating service.”); I.Lan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp.
2d 328, 338 (D. Mass. 2002) (“[T]he Court agrees with those cases embracing the theory of ProCD.”);
DeFontes v. Dell, Inc., 984 A.2d 1061, 1071 (R.I. 2009) (“[W]e are satisfied that the ProCD line of
cases is better reasoned and more consistent with contemporary consumer transactions.”); Moore, 293
A.D.2d at 587 (determining that the use of software after having an opportunity to read extended terms,
rather than the sale of the software in store, marked the formation of a contract); In re AdvancePCS
Health L.P., 172 S.W.3d 603, 608 n.8 (Tex. 2005) (determining that pharmacies that continued to use a
provider network after having an opportunity to read the terms of an associated agreement effectively
accepted the terms); M.A. Mortenson Co., 970 P.2d at 809 (finding that the installation and use of
software manifested assent to terms of a license); see also Stenzel v. Dell, Inc., 870 A.2d 133, 140 (Me.
2005) (applying Texas law to enforce an agreement, which included an arbitration clause, because the
customers accepted delivery of the computer without returning it as outlined in the agreement). But see
John E. Murray, Jr., The Dubious Status of the Rolling Contract Formation Theory, 50 DUQ. L. REV.
35, 36 (2012) (“The majority of jurisdictions have not had the opportunity to decide the fate of the
rolling theory. It is important to pursue a definitive analysis to facilitate future decisions concerning its
application or rejection.”).
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displace terms that were contemplated and not objectionable to the
consumer. Both approaches, therefore, implicate freedom of contract.
Thus, rather than relegating the rolling contract approach to a dark corner
of contract law in favor of a more traditional approach, this Article
proposes that the rolling contract should be rehabilitated.9
But before discussing the rehabilitation of rolling contracts, a basic
question must be addressed. It has been noted that whether consumers
receive the terms of a contract before or after they receive the goods is
irrelevant because they do not read them in either case.10 Therefore, why
should it matter when the terms are received if no one is going to read
them anyway? The answer can perhaps be best framed as a further
question—if it is true that these terms are never read, what is the point in
sending them at all? Why not simply save the time and money of printing
off terms or even having to host such terms on a website? The answer is
assent.11 It is a basic premise of contract law that you cannot be bound by
contract terms of which you are unaware (though you may be bound by
terms which you are put on notice of, and had an opportunity to review12—
thus resulting in “blanket assent”).13 This strikes at the very heart of the
9
Rehabilitate means to restore the good name or to “restore . . . to a condition of health
or useful and constructive activity.”
Rehabilitate, M-W.COM, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/rehabilitate (last visited June 29, 2013). Given that many have abhorred the
rolling contract approach from its inception, perhaps “habilitate” is a more accurate description. See
Habilitate, M-W.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/habilitate (last visited June 29,
2013) (defining habilitate as “to make fit or capable (as for functioning in society)”).
10
Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 679, 682; see
also Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV.
647, 671 (2011) (“[S]ome direct as well as indirect evidence suggests that almost no consumers read
boilerplate, even when it is fully and conspicuously disclosed.”).
11
See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 2.1 (6th ed. 2009)
(“Usually, an essential prerequisite to the formation of a contract is an agreement—a mutual
manifestation of assent to the same terms.”); Nancy S. Kim, Contract’s Adaptation and the Online
Bargain, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1327, 1345 (2011) (“Both assent and consideration are essential to contract
formation.”).
12
See 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 36 (2013) (“An essential prerequisite to the creation of a contract is a
manifestation of mutual assent which must be gathered from the words or acts of the parties, and the
secret intention of one who so acts as to appear to assent is of no consequence. A manifestation of
mutual assent is an essential prerequisite to the creation of a contract. The apparent mutual assent,
essential to the formation of a contract, must be gathered from the language employed by the parties, or
manifested by their words or acts, and it may be manifested wholly or partly by written or spoken
words or by other acts or conduct.” (footnotes omitted)); Jean Braucher, Delayed Disclosure in
Consumer E-Commerce as an Unfair and Deceptive Practice, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1805, 1811 (2000)
(noting that timely disclosure is required as a matter of general contract law).
13
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. c (1981) (“Standardized agreements
are commonly prepared by one party. The customer assents to a few terms, typically inserted in blanks
on the printed form, and gives blanket assent to the type of transaction embodied in the standard
form.”); see also KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370
(1960) (defining “blanket assent” as “any not unreasonable or indecent terms the seller may have on his
form, which do not alter or eviscerate the reasonable meaning of the dickered terms”); Robert A.
Hillman, Rolling Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 743, 750 (2002) (“Llewellyn’s conception of
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rolling contract problem. To what degree does rolling contract theory
align with our conceptions of classical assent as viewed under the
constructs of the offer and acceptance model?
This Article seeks to address the question and explain the rolling
contract theory, though the source of the explanation may be somewhat
unexpected. Existing contract law does a good job of defining contract
offers.15 The trickier issue, particularly when a transaction involves an
initial oral component, is identifying when the offer is actually made.16 In
other words, to go back to our man in the bar—when is it fair to say that he
made the offer in the bar (which was accepted when the bar took his
money), and when is it fair to say that the bar interaction was nothing more
than a preliminary event to the actual offer (which was the writing affixed
to the sandwich)? While many scholars have argued vehemently against
the latter approach,17 in light of what courts are doing, it appears the more
rational course is to now explain when this approach may or may not be
acceptable. When should the offer be at the point of contact (in-store), and
when should it be on a rolling basis? Legal realism, which was a
foundational principle driving the drafting of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, as well as the U.C.C., may offer some insights about how to
approach the rolling contract theory.18 But so may a more recent approach
to contract law—the relational contract approach.19 Relational contract
theory, which essentially treats contracts as ongoing relationships rather
than isolated events, provides a useful way of making this determination.20
Legal realism, also called neo-classicism, abandons contract law as a
rigid set of rules in favor of a softer approach that tries to understand how
‘blanket assent’ is better read to mean only that, despite failing to read form contracts, users
comprehend the existence of standard terms and agree to bind themselves to them, provided the terms
are not unreasonable.”).
14
See Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 233, 250 (2002) (“[T]he essential issue raised by modern consumer contracts is one of assent.”).
15
See U.C.C. § 1-103(b) (2011) (incorporating the common law to supplement U.C.C. provisions,
and thereby following the common law definition of “offer”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 24 (“An offer is the manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another
person in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it.”).
16
See Eric A. Posner, ProCD v. Zeidenberg and Cognitive Overload in Contractual Bargaining,
77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1184–89 (2010) (discussing the nature of the offer under Judge Easterbrook’s
analysis in ProCD II).
17
See Bern, supra note 7, at 642 (addressing the widespread criticism of rolling contracts among
legal scholars).
18
See John E. Murray, Jr., Contract Theories and the Rise of Neoformalism, 71 FORDHAM L.
REV. 869, 870, 879–82 (2002) (delving into legal realism and its influence behind the U.C.C. and
Restatement (Second) of Contracts).
19
See id. at 877–78 (explaining relational contract theory).
20
See id. at 877 (“Instead of the discrete or static transaction underlying classical contract theory,
[Professor Ian] Macneil recognized contract relationships that extend far beyond the original offer and
acceptance and insisted that contract rights and duties should be determined within the overall context
of continuing relationships.”).
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contracts work in the real world.
Legal realism is at the heart of
provisions such as U.C.C. section 2-207’s battle of the forms, which
departed from the common law’s mirror image rule approach to offers and
counter-offers.22 However, the rules set forth in the U.C.C. and
Restatement do a poor job of providing guidance as to the question posed
in the previous paragraph. Relational contract theory has its roots in the
writings of Ian Macneil,23 who believed most contracts were rarely, if ever,
fully thought-out and expressed representations of the parties’
obligations.24 It would therefore seem to be a logical extension of both
legal realism and relational contract theory that certain situations exist
where the parties expect that a contract has not been fully formed in the
store and that further terms, i.e., the formal “offer,” will come later.25 It is
this very flexibility that helps explain the rolling contract, which should
perhaps more accurately be described as a deferred offer.26 If parties to a
contract know that there is more to the contract than simply the price and
the good, then it should come as no surprise that more terms are to follow
or that a more detailed offer will be forthcoming.27 In some scenarios, it is
perfectly reasonable to assume that the contract has not been formed instore, but rather a deferred offer will come later.28 Thus, rolling contract
theory can be explained under a legal realism approach, as influenced by a
relational approach; however, this is not to say that all contracts are now
subject to the rolling contract theory. As this Article explains, some
contracts really are formed at the point of contact under a relational

21
See id. at 886 (“[Neoclassicists] recognize existing rules as neither rigid nor fixed, but pliable
and sometimes entirely outmoded. Unlike other theorists, however, they suggest productive changes in
contract law ranging from modifications to new doctrinal paradigms constituting workable solutions
that courts can understand and use.”).
22
See U.C.C. § 2-207 (2011) (“A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance . . . operates as
an acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon,
unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.”); see
also Murray, supra note 18, at 902–05 (providing background information regarding the drafting of
section 2-207).
23
See Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries, 94 NW. U. L. REV.
877, 877 (2000) (clarifying and expanding his nearly forty years worth of work regarding relational
contracts).
24
See id. at 878 (defining contracts as “exchange relations” rather than “specific transactions,
specific agreements, specific promises, specific exchanges, and the like”).
25
See Murray, supra note 18, at 877 (“While neoclassicists see relational concepts as desirable
elaborations of neoclassical theory, relationists see neoclassical theory as a subset of an ‘overarching
relational legal approach.’” (quoting Macneil, supra note 23, at 907)).
26
See Posner, supra note 16, at 1184–89 (evaluating offers in rolling contracts).
27
See Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L.
REV. 821, 906–08 (1992) (discussing the common sense expectations of parties).
28
See Stephen E. Friedman, Improving the Rolling Contract, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 43–45 (2006)
(analyzing the application of the reasonable expectations doctrine to rolling contracts).
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contract approach. The challenge to the courts is to determine which will
be which. Thus far, courts have done a poor job of doing more than
applying the rolling contract approach to any number of situations with
little explanation as to why it was appropriate under the circumstances to
do so.30 Furthermore, even under a rolling contract approach, such
contracts formed should still be susceptible to contract acceptance
limitations, such as the general rule that a contract cannot be formed by
silence or inaction,31 as well as to defenses, such as unconscionability.32
Indeed, the very fact that a contract is formed as a rolling contract—where
the offer can only be rejected after the goods have been received—should
trigger a higher level of scrutiny under a procedural unconscionability
claim than would a simple contract of adhesion.33
Part II of this Article explains contract formation under both the
U.C.C. and common law with a special emphasis on the battle of the forms
provision of U.C.C. section 2-207. Part III explains how cases such as
ProCD II and its progeny have grappled with, and in some ways
misunderstood, the U.C.C. to reach the conclusion that rolling contracts
exist and are valid. Part IV addresses the weaknesses in the rolling
contract approach and, to a degree, rehabilitates this approach. Part V then
describes how legal realism and the relational contract theory can be used
to explain the rolling contract approach and makes suggestions for how
this relational contract theory can be used to aid courts in determining
which contracts involve a rolling or deferred offer. Part VI concludes that
though rolling contracts may be appropriate in some situations, there are
still limits on this approach, and it should be carefully scrutinized given the
way in which the offer was delivered.
II. CONTRACT FORMATION UNDER THE U.C.C. AND COMMON LAW
Before delving into the rolling contract approach, it is important to
29
See Macneil, supra note 23, at 881 (“A relational contract theory may be defined as any theory
based on the following four core propositions: First, every transaction is embedded in complex
relations. Second, understanding any transaction requires understanding all essential elements of its
enveloping relations.
Third, effective analysis of any transaction requires recognition and
consideration of all essential elements of its enveloping relations that might affect the transaction
significantly. Fourth, combined contextual analysis of relations and transactions is more efficient and
produces a more complete and sure final analytical product than does commencing with non-contextual
analysis of transactions.” (footnotes omitted)).
30
See infra note 152.
31
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69 (1981) (limiting the circumstances in which
silence and inaction operate as an acceptance).
32
See Friedman, supra note 28, at 35–36 (discussing unconscionability in the rolling contract
context).
33
See, e.g., Lima v. Gateway, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1182 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (listing several
factors that made an arbitration provision “procedurally unconscionable to a high degree” in a rolling
contract context).
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review the basics of offer and acceptance under both the common law and
the U.C.C., as well as highlight how the U.C.C. departs from the common
law in some key areas. This background is necessary to understand how
the rolling contract departs from what some may deem a more traditional
approach to contract formation. However, a basic understanding is also
necessary in order to explain how the rolling contract approach can exist
without contradicting existing contract rules.
A. Offer and Acceptance Under the U.C.C. and Common Law
The Restatement defines an offer as “the manifestation of willingness
to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in
understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude
it.”34 The U.C.C., which applies only to the sale of goods, does not contain
a definition of “offer,” but by virtue of section 1-103 it incorporates the
common law to supplement its provisions.35 Thus, an offer is defined
similarly under both the common law and the U.C.C. The U.C.C. also
defines “acceptance” in terms very similar to the Restatement.36 Section 2206 provides: “Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language
or circumstances . . . an offer to make a contract shall be construed as
inviting acceptance in any manner and by any medium reasonable in the
circumstances.”37 The Restatement provides: “Acceptance of an offer is a
manifestation of assent to the terms thereof made by the offeree in a
manner invited or required by the offer.”38 Furthermore, as to contract
formation in general, the U.C.C. articulates a broad conception of when
and how a contract may be formed under section 2-204, which states:
(1) A contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner
sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both
parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract.
(2) An agreement sufficient to constitute a contract for sale
may be found even though the moment of its making is
undetermined.
34

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24.
See U.C.C. § 1-103(b) (2011) (“Unless displaced by the particular provisions of [the Uniform
Commercial Code], the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to
capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake,
bankruptcy, and other validating or invalidating cause supplement its provisions.” (alteration in
original)).
36
Compare id. § 2-206 (defining “acceptance” in terms of a sale of goods), with RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 50 (defining “acceptance” as an assent to terms made by the offeree).
37
U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(a).
38
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 50(1). Section 50 also states: “Acceptance by
performance requires that at least part of what the offer requests be performed or tendered and includes
acceptance by a performance which operates as a return promise.” Id. § 50(2).
35
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(3) Even though one or more terms are left open a contract
for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have
intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain
basis for giving an appropriate remedy.39
This last provision reflects the strong influence of the legal realism
movement on the drafting of the U.C.C. and encourages a less rigid
approach to contract formation.
One area that has caused some confusion regarding offers involves
advertisements. For instance, when a consumer walks into a store and sees
a price listed on a hammer, is the price an offer or merely a solicitation?
The U.C.C. provides no guidance on this issue, but the Restatement
provides that “[a] manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain is not
an offer if the person to whom it is addressed knows or has reason to know
that the person making it does not intend to conclude a bargain until he has
made a further manifestation of assent.”40 Corbin has added:
It is quite possible to make a definite and operative offer to
buy or sell goods by advertisement, in a newspaper, by a
handbill, a catalog or circular or on a placard in a store
window. It is not customary to do this, however; and the
presumption is the other way. Usually, neither the advertiser
nor the reader of the notice understands that the reader is
empowered to close the deal without further expression by
the advertiser. Such advertisements are understood to be
mere requests to consider and examine and negotiate; and no
one can reasonably regard them otherwise unless the
circumstances are exceptional and the words used are very
plain and clear.41
It appears that the presumption is that an advertisement, or listed price
in-store or in a catalog, is not an offer but a solicitation.42 The offer must
therefore come later—either when the consumer tenders cash, which could
mean the offer is accepted when the money is accepted, or the offer could
occur when the sales clerk announces the price, which could mean it is
accepted when the money is tendered.43 The offer and acceptance could
39

U.C.C. § 2-204.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 26.
41
1 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 2.4 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., Mathew Bender &
Co. rev. ed. 2013), available at LEXIS.
42
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 26 cmt. b (“Advertisements of goods by
display, sign, handbill, newspaper, radio or television are not ordinarily intended or understood as
offers to sell.”); CORBIN, supra note 41, § 2.4 (stating that it is “not customary” to make an offer
through an advertisement).
43
See U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (“A contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to
show agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such a
40
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occur in some other manner as well, but it is probably safe to say that once
the consumer leaves with the hammer, a contract has been formed.44
The U.C.C. breaks from the common law in one important aspect
under section 2-206 with regard to orders for prompt shipment of goods. If
an offer asks for the prompt or current shipment of goods, the offeree may
accept by tendering conforming or nonconforming goods.45 This breaks
from the common law, which would view the tender of nonconforming
goods as a counter-offer that could be accepted or rejected by the original
offeror.46 The effect of section 2-206 is that a seller tendering
nonconforming goods has accepted the offer and breached all in the same
action.47 Section 2-206 provides that to avoid this result, the seller must
seasonably notify that the shipment of the nonconforming goods is meant
as an accommodation.48 If the seller does so, the shipment will, in fact, be
a counter-offer.49
B. The “Battle of the Forms” and Confirmations
Though section 2-206 provides a break from the common law, section
2-207 provides perhaps one of the greatest examples of how the U.C.C.
altered the results of common law offer and acceptance.50 Section 2-207,
contract.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (defining an offer as “the manifestation of
willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent
to that bargain is invited and will conclude it”). The tendering of cash or the announcement of the price
could both qualify as an offer under this standard. Determining what qualifies as the offer depends on
what is reasonable under the circumstances, which of course can lead to incongruous results in cases.
See PERILLO, supra note 11, § 2.6(g) (“[T]he test is whether a reasonable person in the position of the
plaintiff would conclude that the defendant had made a commitment. Under such a test, it is not
surprising to find that there are often differences of opinion as to the correct result in a concrete case.”).
44
See U.C.C. § 2-204(2) (“An agreement sufficient to constitute a contract for sale may be found
even though the moment of its making is undetermined.”).
45
See id. § 2-206(1)(b) (“[A]n order or other offer to buy goods for prompt or current shipment
shall be construed as inviting acceptance either by a prompt promise to ship or by the prompt or current
shipment of conforming or non-conforming goods.”).
46
See 1 E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 3.21, at 315 (3d ed. 2004) (“An
attempt to add to or change the terms of the offer turns the offeree’s response from an acceptance into a
counteroffer and a rejection of the offer.”).
47
See U.C.C. § 2-206 cmt. 4 (“Such a non-conforming shipment is normally to be understood as
intended to close the bargain, even though it proves to have been at the same time a breach.”).
48
See id. § 2-206(1)(b) (“[S]uch a shipment of non-conforming goods does not constitute an
acceptance if the seller seasonably notifies the buyer that the shipment is offered only as an
accommodation to the buyer.”).
49
See id. § 2-206 cmt. 4 (explaining that notification to the buyer that the non-conforming goods
are offered merely as an accommodation avoids such notification or shipment of the non-conforming
goods from being the acceptance).
50
See Colin P. Marks, The Limits of Limiting Liability in the Battle of the Forms: U.C.C. Section
2-207 and the “Material Alteration” Inquiry, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 501, 510 (2006) (noting that, under
U.C.C. section 2-207, “the rigid common law ‘mirror image rule’ has given way to a more realistic
approach to contract formation”); John E. Murray, Jr., The Definitive “Battle of the Forms”: Chaos
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also known as the “Battle of the Forms” provision, applies in two
situations. The first situation occurs when there is an oral or written offer
and an acceptance that varies the terms of the offer.51 Under the common
law, the purported acceptance, which varies the terms of the offer, would
be deemed a counter-offer.52 This was known as the “mirror-image” rule,
meaning that an acceptance must mirror the offer or result in a counteroffer.53 However, because in real life, buyers and sellers frequently
exchanged forms with boilerplate terms that no one read, to apply the
common law would mean that the party that sent the last form would have
the contract on his or her terms.54 The drafters of the U.C.C., heavily
influenced by the legal realism movement, saw this as an absurdity.55
Therefore, to avoid application of this “last shot” doctrine whereby the last
form won, the U.C.C. permits an acceptance that varies or adds terms to
the offer to still act as an acceptance so long as the acceptance is “definite
and seasonable.”56
Section 2-207(2) then addresses what to do with the additional terms.57
The general rule is that they are proposals for addition to the contract, and
as between non-merchants, or as between a merchant and a non-merchant,
section 2-207(2) leaves it at that.58 This scant line has generally been
accepted to mean that these additional terms become a part of the contract

Revisited, 20 J.L. & COM. 1, 2–3 (2000) (noting that U.C.C. section 2-207 was designed to break from
the common law to end the injustice created from the “mirror-image” rule and “last shot” doctrine).
51
U.C.C. § 2-207.
52
See Hollywood Fantasy Corp. v. Gabor, 151 F.3d 203, 208 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Under this ‘mirror
image’ rule, a modification of an offer qualifies as a rejection and counteroffer only if the modification
is ‘material.’”).
53
See Murray, supra note 50, at 2 (“The common law ‘mirror-image’ rule requires the acceptance
to match the terms of the offer. Where a response to an offer contains different or additional terms in
boilerplate clauses, the mirror-image rule insists that the response must be a ‘conditional acceptance,’
i.e., a counteroffer, even though it reasonably appears to be a definite expression of acceptance.”).
54
See Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 99 (3d Cir. 1991) (“If the offeror
proceeded with the contract despite the differing terms of the supposed acceptance, he would, by his
performance, constructively accept the terms of the ‘counteroffer’, and be bound by its terms. As a
result of these rules, the terms of the party who sent the last form, typically the seller, would become
the terms of the parties’s [sic] contract.”).
55
See Murray, supra note 50, at 3 (“The seller, however, ships the goods which the buyer accepts,
thereby unwittingly accepting the seller’s terms in the counteroffer that had been fired as the ‘last shot’
in the battle. Though the buyer is unfairly surprised to learn that the contract contains the seller’s
terms, this is the result ordained under the ‘last shot’ principle. Section 2-207 was designed to remedy
this injustice.”).
56
See U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (“A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance . . . operates as an
acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon,
unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.”).
57
See id. § 2-207(2) (addressing what becomes of the additional terms in the contract formed
under section 2-207(1)).
58
See id. (“The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the contract.”).
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59

only if the offeror expressly consents to the terms. However, as between
merchants, the rule is that the additional terms become a part of the
contract unless one of three conditions are met: “(a) the offer expressly
limits acceptance to the terms of the offer; (b) they materially alter it; or (c)
notification of objection to them has already been given or is given within
a reasonable time after notice of them is received.”60
Though section 2-207 addresses how to treat additional terms under
section 2-207(2), a method of how to deal with terms that vary the terms of
the offer is nowhere to be found.61 With regard to situations that involve a
non-merchant, the general rule apparently still applies, and such variations
will become a part of the contract only if the offeror expressly assents to
them.62 With regard to transactions between merchants, the rules get
trickier with a number of jurisdictions adopting a “knock-out” rule,
whereby the conflicting terms are each removed and the court fills the gaps
made by the knocked-out terms.63
If an offeree wishes to avoid application of section 2-207(2), he or she
may make the acceptance expressly conditional on the terms of the
acceptance.64 An acceptance that does so is not an acceptance under
section 2-207(1); however, the acceptance does not qualify as a true
counter-offer either.65 Instead, by operation of section 2-207(3), the court
must look to whether the parties carried on as if there was a contract.66 If
so, then a contract is formed, but only on the terms which match up

59
See Murray, supra note 50, at 7–8 (addressing the effect of section 2-207 in merchant and nonmerchant situations).
60
U.C.C. § 2-207(2).
61
See id. § 2-207 (failing to address what becomes of different terms in the contract formed under
2-207(1)).
62
See Murray, supra note 50, at 7–8 (discussing how section 2-207 applies to both merchants and
non-merchants).
63
See, e.g., Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569, 1579 (10th Cir. 1984) (“The . . .
preferable approach, which is commonly called the ‘knock-out’ rule, is that the conflicting terms cancel
one another. Under this view the offeree’s form is treated only as an acceptance of the terms in the
offeror’s form which did not conflict. The ultimate contract, then, includes those non-conflicting terms
and any other terms supplied by the U.C.C., including terms incorporated by course of performance
(§ 2-208), course of dealing (§ 1-205), usage of trade (§ 1-205), and other ‘gap fillers’ or ‘off-the-rack’
terms (e.g., implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose, § 2-315).”).
64
See U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (“A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written
confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states
terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made
conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.” (emphasis added)).
65
See id. § 2-207(3) (addressing the effect of both parties’ conduct, which recognizes a contract
though a contract was not truly formed).
66
See id. (“Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is sufficient to
establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do not otherwise establish a contract.”).
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67

between the offer and acceptance. Thus, additional and different terms in
the purported acceptance would again fall away, and the court would be
left to gap-fill.68
The above description lays out the first situation that section 2-207 was
intended to address—an offer with an acceptance that varies or adds to the
non-core terms (or the traditional “battle of the forms”). The section also
rather awkwardly addresses a second situation: confirmations.69 Section 2207(1) by its terms applies to a “definite and seasonable expression of
acceptance or a written confirmation.”70 Thus, if a contract is formed
orally, either over the phone or in person, and one of the parties later sends
a written confirmation, any additional or varied terms in the writing will be
subject to section 2-207.71 As to a transaction that involves non-merchants,
the same result should apply as above.72 The additional and different terms
are simply proposals, which can be ignored by the other party, and they do
not become a part of the contract unless both parties expressly assent to
them.73 As between merchants, again the nature of the terms will be an
issue with additional terms being subject to section 2-207(2)(a)–(c).74
C. Application of the “Battle of the Forms” to a Typical In-Store
Transaction
With these basics in mind, let us return to the sandwich hypothetical
from the introduction. When the man walks into the bar and sees the
menu, most courts would agree that the menu is a solicitation rather than
an offer.75 When the man places his order, this is most likely the offer,
which the bar accepts either when it takes his money or at the very least
67
See id. (“In such case the terms of the particular contract consist of those terms on which the
writings of the parties agree, together with any supplementary terms incorporated under any other
provisions of this Act.”).
68
See id. (stating that “supplementary terms” from other U.C.C. provisions may be incorporated
into the contract).
69
Id. § 2-207(1).
70
Id. (emphasis added).
71
See id. § 2-207(2) (“The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the
contract.”); see also Murray, supra note 50, at 22 (providing a written confirmation hypothetical).
72
See U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (establishing that additional terms in written confirmations will “be
construed as proposals for addition to the contract” involving non-merchants).
73
Id.
74
See id. (asserting that additional terms do not become part of a contract between merchants if:
“(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer; (b) they materially alter it; or (c)
notification of objection to them has already been given or is given within a reasonable time after
notice of them is received”).
75
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 26 (1981) (“A manifestation of willingness to
enter into a bargain is not an offer if the person to whom it is addressed knows or has reason to know
that the person making it does not intend to conclude a bargain until he has made a further
manifestation of assent.”); CORBIN, supra note 41, § 2.4 (“[A]dvertisements that describe goods for
sale at a given price are not reasonably to be understood as offers.”).
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gives him the sandwich, as either would appear to be a reasonable mode of
acceptance under the circumstances.76 Under this formulation, the parties
have a contract; so when the buyer gets back home or to his office and sees
additional terms, it would appear that this is a confirmation.77 By
application of sections 2-207(1) and (2), if the buyer is a non-merchant, he
can ignore these terms and eat his sandwich without concern for whether
the act of opening or eating the sandwich will somehow bind him to these
additional terms.78
Alternatively, our man in the bar could have had a delivery menu, and
rather than travel in person to the bar, he could have called his order in for
delivery. Again, the menu would not act as the offer but a solicitation.
The call ordering the sandwich would be the offer, which the store could
accept either orally or by charging his card, or under section 2-206(1)(b)
by promptly shipping the sandwich.79 At the latest, once the goods are
shipped, the contract is formed, and again the additional terms would
simply serve as a confirmation subject to section 2-207(2).80
The above basically describes how many thought contract formation
under the U.C.C. would treat in-store and over-the-phone transactions. It
should be noted, however, that if the contract is in fact formed over the
phone or in the store, the common law would not vary greatly from the
above approach in situations involving non-merchants. In situation one,
the modification could not be unilaterally imposed upon the other party
once a contract was formed and would additionally need to have
consideration to support it (which is not required under the U.C.C.).81
Similarly, if a contract was formed over the phone, then the later terms
would simply be proposed modifications.

76
See U.C.C. §§ 1-103(b), 2-206 (incorporating common law to supplement the U.C.C.
provisions and defining an offer and acceptance in the formation of a contract); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 24, 50 (defining an “offer” and “acceptance,” respectively).
77
See U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (discussing additional terms); see also Murray, supra note 50, at 22
(“Section 2-207(1) treats a confirmation as if it were an acceptance so that any different or additional
terms are subject to 2-207(2) like any other definite expression of acceptance.”).
78
See U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (“The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to
the contract.”).
79
See id. § 2-206(1)(b) (“[A]n order or other offer to buy goods for prompt or current shipment
shall be construed as inviting acceptance either by a prompt promise to ship or by the prompt or current
shipment of conforming or non-conforming goods.”).
80
See id. § 2-207(1)–(2) (establishing that such a written confirmation would operate as an
acceptance despite its additional terms). The terms would be “proposals,” as the hypothetical involves
a non-merchant.
81
See id. § 2-209(1) (stating that an agreement “modifying a contract . . . needs no consideration
to be binding”); see also id. § 2-207(1) (establishing that an expression of acceptance or a written
confirmation will operate as an acceptance even if it has been modified to state additional terms).
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III. THE BIRTH OF THE “ROLLING CONTRACT”
A. Development of the Rolling Contract Approach
Though Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in ProCD II is one of the seminal
cases in the development of rolling contract theory, the United States
Supreme Court may have paved the way for Easterbrook five years earlier
in the case of Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute.82 In Shute, the Court
was faced with the enforceability of a forum selection clause.83 The
petitioner, Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., sold the Shutes cruise tickets
through a travel agent.84 The Shutes paid for the tickets and were
subsequently sent the tickets along with attached pages with additional
terms and conditions of sale.85 Among the terms was a forum selection
clause stipulating that all disputes would be litigated in Florida (Carnival’s
principal place of business).86 During the course of the cruise, Mrs. Shute
was injured while in international waters and brought suit in federal court
in Washington.87 Carnival moved for summary judgment based upon the
forum selection clause and lack of personal jurisdiction, which the district
court granted based upon the latter.88 The court of appeals reversed,
holding that jurisdiction was not lacking, and that the forum selection
clause should not be enforced as it was not freely bargained for.89
The Supreme Court reviewed the clause in light of its own precedent
under Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Co.,90 another admiralty decision in
which the validity of a forum selection clause negotiated by two
sophisticated parties was upheld.91 The Shute Court noted that the forum
selection clause at issue in Shute, unlike the one in Bremen, was one of
adhesion, neither freely bargained for nor the subject of negotiation.92
82
499 U.S. 585 (1991), superseded by statute, Provisions Limiting Liability for Personal Injury or
Death, 46 U.S.C. § 30509 (2006), as recognized in Oran v. Fair Wind Sailing, Inc., No. 08-0034, 2009
WL 4349321, at *7 n.5 (D.V.I. Nov. 23, 2009); see Hillman, supra note 13, at 744–47 (describing
standard-form contracts and the development of rolling contract theory).
83
Shute, 499 U.S. at 587.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 587–88.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 588.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 588–89. The court of appeals alternatively held that there was evidence that the Shutes
were physically and financially incapable of pursuing their claim if the clause was enforced. Id. at 589.
90
407 U.S. 1 (1972).
91
Id. at 15–17.
92
Shute, 499 U.S. at 593. Though the Court did not use the term “contract of adhesion,” its
description of the forum selection clause at issue meets the classic definition of one. The Court
described the clause thusly:

In contrast, respondents’ passage contract was purely routine and doubtless nearly
identical to every commercial passage contract issued by petitioner and most other
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Despite this conclusion, the Court upheld the clause’s validity based on
what it termed the “reasonableness” of the clause under the
circumstances.93 Specifically, the Court noted three rationales for why the
clause was “reasonable,” all of which implicated economic concerns.
First, the Court noted that Carnival had an interest in limiting where it
could be sued, particularly given the diverse make-up of its clientele’s
citizenship.94 Second, picking a forum in advance would save litigant and
judicial resources by providing clarity as to where suit could be brought,
thus limiting the expense of pretrial motions.95 Finally, the Court opined
that consumers as a whole would actually benefit from such clauses as
ticket prices would reflect the savings that cruise lines enjoyed by limiting
where they could be sued.96 The Court did caveat its decision on the
premise that all such clauses should be subject to judicial scrutiny,
indicating that bad faith, fraud, over-reaching, and lack of conspicuousness
should all be examined.97 However, the facts did not support such claims,
and thus the clause was upheld.98
There are a number of facts in the Shute decision that should be noted
to limit its application. First and foremost, the decision was one of the rare
opportunities through which the Supreme Court opined on contract law
without reference to state law, as the case was decided under the Court’s
admiralty jurisdiction.99 Furthermore, the Court did not address the issue
of whether a contract was formed due to lack of notice directly; indeed, the
Shutes did not contest that the terms of the forum selection clause were
reasonably communicated to them.100 Thus, the issue of when the offer
cruise lines. In this context, it would be entirely unreasonable for us to assume that
respondents—or any other cruise passenger—would negotiate with petitioners the
terms of a forum-selection clause in an ordinary commercial cruise ticket. Common
sense dictates that a ticket of this kind will be a form contract the terms of which are
not subject to negotiation, and that an individual purchasing the ticket will not have
bargaining parity with the cruise line.
Id. (citations omitted).
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 593–94.
96
Id. at 594. The Court additionally dismissed the court of appeals’s alternative ground that the
Shutes would be incapable of pursuing litigation in Florida for financial and physical reasons as
unsupported by the record. Id.
97
Id. at 595.
98
Id. The Court also rejected the Shutes’ argument that the forum selection clause violated 46
U.S.C. § 183c, which limited the ability of vessel owners to contractually alter the rights of passengers
to sue. See id. at 595–97 (finding that the language of the forum-selection clause “does not take away
respondents’ right to ‘a trial by [a] court of competent jurisdiction’” in violation of § 183c; rather, the
forum-selection clause “states specifically that actions arising out of the passage contract shall be
brought” in a “court of competent jurisdiction”).
99
Id. at 590.
100
Id.

92

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:73

and acceptance occurred, which is a central inquiry in rolling contract
cases, was not squarely before the Court. Even if it was, its precedential
value under state law would have been merely persuasive. Nonetheless,
echoes of the Court’s reasonableness analysis and its economic rationales
can be found in subsequent rolling contract cases, particularly in ProCD
II.101
The ProCD II opinion, authored by Judge Frank H. Easterbrook, is the
modern genesis of rolling contract theory.102 The facts at issue in the case
mirror, in many ways, the hypotheticals used in Part I and Part II of this
Article. Matthew Zeidenberg entered a local retail store and bought
ProCD’s product, “Select Phone,” which was a CD-ROM disk containing
over 95,000,000 telephone listings compiled by ProCD.103 Inside the
package was a user guide, which also contained a “Single User License
Agreement” that prohibited the purchaser from copying the software other
than for personal use.104 Additionally, once the software was loaded, the
license would appear on most screens before the listings could be
accessed.105 The license provided that: “By using the discs and the listings
licensed to you, you agree to be bound by the terms of this License. If you
do not agree to the terms of this License, promptly return all copies of the
software . . . to the place where you obtained it.”106 The software’s box
made reference to the license on the outside in small print, but did not give
any details.107 Zeidenberg purchased Select Phone in late 1994 and soon
realized he could copy the information and make it available to the public
himself.108 He subsequently incorporated under the name Silken Mountain
Web Services, Inc. and purchased an updated version of Select Phone.109
Zeidenberg ignored the license agreement, believing it was not binding,
and eventually made his database available over the Internet.110
ProCD learned of Zeidenberg’s actions and brought suit to enjoin him,
claiming both a violation of copyright law as well as violation of the
101
See ProCD II, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451 (7th Cir. 1996) (“The ticket contains elaborate terms, which
the traveler can reject by canceling the reservation. To use the ticket is to accept the terms, even terms
that in retrospect are disadvantageous.” (citing Shute, 499 U.S. 585)).
102
See DeFontes v. Dell, Inc., 984 A.2d 1061, 1068 (R.I. 2009) (“In ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,
the court challenged the traditional understanding of offer and acceptance in consumer transactions by
holding that a buyer of software was bound by an agreement that was included within the packaging
and later appeared when the buyer first used the software.” (citation omitted)).
103
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg (ProCD I), 908 F. Supp. 640, 644–45 (W.D. Wis.), rev’d, 86 F.3d
1447, 1451 (7th Cir. 1996).
104
Id. at 644.
105
Id. at 644–45.
106
Id. at 644.
107
Id. at 645.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id. at 645–46.
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111

license agreement.
After dispatching ProCD’s copyright claim, the
district court turned to the enforceability of the license agreement under the
U.C.C.112 In its analysis, the court considered whether the contract offer
was accepted once Zeidenberg had received the goods and had an
opportunity to inspect them, or whether the contract was formed in the
store and thus the terms of the license should be viewed under either
U.C.C. section 2-207 or as a modification under section 2-209.113
Reviewing section 2-206, the court concluded that the act of placing the
Select Phone product on the store shelf constituted the offer,114 which was
accepted by Zeidenberg when he paid for the software.115 With the
contract formed in the store, the district court concluded that the additional
terms of the license agreement were mere proposals that could be ignored
by Zeidenberg either under section 2-207(2) or as a modification under
section 2-209, both of which would require Zeidenberg’s express
consent.116 Thus, the district court’s approach was generally in line with
the consensus on how such terms should be treated, as discussed in Part II.
On appeal, Judge Easterbrook began his analysis by noting that
Zeidenberg and the district court had found that the offer was made when
the goods were placed on the shelf.117 Easterbrook did not take issue with
this premise, but instead questioned the district court’s treatment of the

111

Id. at 646, 650.
Id. at 650–51. The district court noted that the sale of software put forward a question of
whether Article II of the U.C.C., which applies to the sale of “goods,” should apply. Id. The district
court chose to apply Article II, believing it the sounder approach to software transactions. Id. at 651.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 651–52. This conclusion is counter to the generally accepted rule that placing of the
goods on the shelf is not the offer, but merely a solicitation. See CORBIN, supra note 41, § 2.4 (“It is
quite possible to make a definite and operative offer to buy or sell goods by advertisement, in a
newspaper, by a handbill, a catalog or circular or on a placard in a store window. It is not customary to
do this, however; and the presumption is the other way.” (footnote omitted)). Apparently, the argument
that the offer was made by Zeidenberg in the store when he tendered his money was not made to the
court. See Gerald Caplan, Legal Autopsies: Assessing the Performance of Judges and Lawyers
Through the Window of Leading Contract Cases, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1, 39 n.218 (2009) (“The record in
ProCD, however, indicates that it was the parties, not the trial court or the Seventh Circuit, who so
decided.”); see also Epstein, supra note 1, at 109 (“The Easterbrook analysis of delayed
acceptance . . . solves the central problem with shrinkwrap contracts.”).
115
ProCD I, 908 F. Supp. at 652.
116
See id. at 654–55 (finding that the defendants were not bound by the user agreement under
either section 2-207 or section 2-209, because they had not expressly agreed to the terms contained
therein). Interestingly, the court seemed to assume Zeidenberg was a consumer and thus did not
consider the application of subsections 2-207(2)(a)–(c). It seems possible that Zeidenberg could have
been bound, as a merchant, to the license agreement if it did not materially alter the contract. See
U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(b) (2011) (providing that additional terms in an acceptance become part of a
contract between merchants unless “they materially alter it”). The court may have considered this
argument mooted by its subsequent holding in the same opinion that ProCD’s contract claims were
preempted under federal copyright law. ProCD I, 908 F. Supp. at 659.
117
ProCD II, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996).
112
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acceptance, which the district court held occurred in the store.118
Easterbrook did not agree with this premise, asking: “[w]hy would
Wisconsin fetter the parties’ choice in this way?”119 Easterbrook then
described the advantages of permitting standard term agreements to be
enforceable, despite the fact that they are often read for the first time after
the buyer has the goods.120 These advantages include the saved time and
expense of trying to describe all of the terms on the outside of a box.121 As
examples of the utility of such contracts, Easterbrook references the
insurance industry, drug industry, and the purchase of airline and concert
tickets, all of which take advantage of the ability to provide information or
terms after a purchase has been made.122 Interestingly, Easterbrook
frequently refers to the ongoing relationship between the purchaser and the
seller, such as the expected coverage an insured immediately gets when the
premium is paid, though the details are still coming.123 While there may be
practical and economic advantages (particularly to the vendor/seller) in
doing business in such a way, what of the district court’s analysis under
section 2-207? Easterbrook summarily dismisses its application stating,
“Our case has only one form; UCC § 2-207 is irrelevant.”124
Instead of analyzing under section 2-207 (or section 2-206, which is
not even mentioned), Easterbrook turned to U.C.C. section 2-204 as the
guiding principle for such “terms later” contracts.125 Section 2-204 broadly
provides that a contract may be formed “in any manner sufficient to show
agreement,” which Easterbrook used to justify his view that the vendor or
seller is the master of its offer and can choose to invite acceptance by
conduct, such as by using the product.126 This view of contract formation
is limited by the caveat that the buyer must be given an opportunity to
review and reject the offer; otherwise, such contracts are enforceable.127
Thus, as Zeidenberg had been given notice of the license agreement and
continued to use the software, he was bound by the license agreement’s
118

Id.
Id. at 1450–51.
120
See id. at 1451 (“Notice on the outside, terms on the inside, and a right to return the software
for a refund if the terms are unacceptable . . . may be a means of doing business valuable to buyers and
sellers alike.”).
121
See id. (“Vendors can put the entire terms of a contract on the outside of a box only by using
microscopic type, removing other information that buyers might find more useful . . . or both.”).
122
Id. (citing Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991)).
123
Id.
124
Id. at 1452. Easterbrook does not appear to address the district court’s section 2-209
discussion; however, given his conclusion that these were the terms of the contract rather than a
modification of an already existing contract, the omission is not surprising.
125
Id.
126
Id. (quoting U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (1995)).
127
See id. (“A buyer may accept by performing the acts the vendor proposes to treat as
acceptance. And that is what happened.”).
119
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128

terms.

B. ProCD II’s Progeny and the Limits of the Rolling Contract Approach
Many questioned the applicability of ProCD II beyond the narrow
facts at hand.129 The case involved a buyer, who was arguably a merchant
and had notice of the terms at issue prior to purchasing the subsequent CDROMs.130 Additionally, the case involved an atypical good—software.131
However, any doubt about how Easterbrook felt about the broader
applicability of his new view of contract formation was quickly addressed
a little over seven months later when he authored the opinion in Hill v.
Gateway 2000, Inc.132
In Hill, Rich and Enza Hill purchased a Gateway computer over the
phone.133 The Hills gave their credit card information, but were never
alerted to any additional terms that were coming with the computer.134
Once the computer arrived, the Hills found a list of terms inside the box—
including an arbitration clause—that purportedly governed the parties’
agreement unless the Hills returned the product within thirty days.135 The
Hills did not return the computer within the thirty-day period, but
eventually found fault with the computer and sought to sue Gateway for
civil RICO violations.136 Gateway invoked the arbitration clause, but the
district court refused to uphold the clause because the Hills were not given
adequate notice of the terms.137
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, finding that the
terms of the contract that came in the box were fully enforceable.138 Citing
to ProCD II, as well as to Shute, Judge Easterbrook, with broad strokes,
affirmed the use of standard form contracts that come later, stating that
these cases “exemplify the many commercial transactions in which people
pay for products with terms to follow.”139 Easterbrook stated that the
128
Id. at 1452–53. The court of appeals went on to address the district court’s alternative finding
that the contract was preempted by federal law and found that the Copyright Act did not preempt
ProCD’s contract claim. Id. at 1454–55.
129
See, e.g., Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1337–38 (D. Kan. 2000) (comparing
cases that had to determine “whether terms received with a product become part of the parties’
agreement” and noting that the cases partly turn on whether it is found that the parties formed the
contract before or after terms are communicated).
130
ProCD II, 86 F.3d at 1449–50.
131
Id. at 1449.
132
105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
133
Id. at 1148.
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id. at 1151.
139
Id. at 1148–49.
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transaction at issue was governed by these same principles, as Gateway
used the “same sort of accept-or-return offer ProCD made to users of its
software.”140 Of particular note is that Easterbrook explicitly rejected the
notion that ProCD II should be limited to software sales,141 or that it
mattered whether there was a notice of the coming terms on the outside of
the box (as was the case in ProCD II).142 Easterbrook also dismissed the
notion that the ProCD II decision somehow turned upon application of
U.C.C. section 2-207, again erroneously dismissing the provision as
irrelevant because there was only one form;143 however, he did elaborate
on the true question presented in ProCD II:
The question in ProCD was not whether terms were added to
a contract after its formation, but how and when the contract
was formed—in particular, whether a vendor may propose
that a contract of sale be formed, not in the store (or over the
phone) with the payment of money or a general “send me the
product,” but after the customer has had a chance to inspect
both the item and the terms. ProCD answers “yes,” for
merchants and consumers alike.144
Thus, to Easterbrook, the issue was simple—whether a vendor can
transform an in-store or over-the-phone contract into a mere offer—and it
was resolved in favor of the vendor whom he claims is the “master of the
offer.”145 However, Easterbrook gives no guidance on the issue of when, if
ever, a contract is formed in-store or over-the-phone. His analysis in Hill,
like in ProCD II, seems to turn on the simple efficiency (and thus
economics) of rolling contracts rather than on the intention of the parties or
the nature of their relationship under the contract.146 Indeed, Easterbrook
140

Id. at 1149.
Id.
142
Id. at 1150. Easterbrook also noted, in dicta, that he was doubtful of Zeidenberg’s merchant
status, even if section 2-207 did apply, as he bought the software at a retail shop. Id. This fact should
not preclude merchant status, but has added fodder for those who have excoriated his application of the
U.C.C. See, e.g., Cheryl B. Preston & Eli W. McCann, Unwrapping Shrinkwraps, Clickwraps, and
Browsewraps: How the Law Went Wrong from Horse Traders to the Law of the Horse, 26 BYU J.
PUB. L. 1, 10 (2011) (“[ProCD II] is a classic case of putting the cart before the horse. Rather than
resolve the case through the mechanism established in the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) for
dealing with later additions of new and different terms, Judge Easterbrook first articulated the result he
believed he had to obtain for purposes of supporting market economics, and then simply declared that
the terms were enforceable without much effort to locate a rule somewhere in traditional contract law.”
(footnote omitted)).
143
Hill, 105 F.3d at 1149–50.
144
Id. at 1150.
145
Id. at 1149.
146
See id. (“Practical considerations support allowing vendors to enclose the full legal terms with
their products. Cashiers cannot be expected to read legal documents to customers before ringing up
sales.”).
141
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dismisses the notion that it should matter whether the contract is an
executory one;147 however, he does note that the contracts at issue in both
ProCD II and Hill involved continuing obligations, such as ongoing
customer service and warranties, perhaps indicating that such obligations
factored into the analysis.148 Furthermore, in both cases, Easterbrook
pointed out that there was notice of additional terms to come, though in
Hill the notice was through Gateway’s advertisements rather than on the
box.149
Despite the analytical flaws in both ProCD II and Hill, the opinions
have been widely cited and adopted in a number of decisions on the issue
of whether “rolling” or “layered” contracts are enforceable. Some
commentators150 and a number of courts, both state and federal, have cited
approvingly to the “rolling contract” approach.151 Unfortunately, a number
147

Id. at 1149–50.
See id. at 1149 (“[B]oth ProCD and Gateway promised to help customers to use their products.
Long-term service and information obligations are common in the computer business, on both
hardware and software sides.”).
149
Id. at 1150.
150
See Epstein, supra note 1, at 122 (defending Easterbrook’s approach on intellectual grounds
and suggesting that courts and commentators that are critical of the approach are uneasy with the way it
meshes with traditional doctrinal analysis); Hillman, supra note 13, at 744–45 (arguing that because
few parties even think about when contract formation occurs, and given that consumers do not read the
terms regardless of when the contract was formed, the formation issue should not be a bar to rolling
contracts and such contracts should instead simply be reviewed for their conscionability); see also
Andrew Vogeler, Note, Rolling Contract Formation and the U.C.C.’s Approach to Emerging
Commercial Practices, 30 J.L. & COM. 243, 243–44 (2012) (arguing that rolling contract theory is
consistent with the policies underlying the U.C.C.). This approach has also been adopted under the
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA). UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS
ACT § 202 cmt. 4 (2002).
151
See, e.g., Sherr v. Dell, Inc., No. 05 CV 10097(GBD), 2006 WL 2109436, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July
27, 2006) (“Approve-or-return contracts have been found to be enforceable in consumer
transactions.”); Meridian Project Sys., Inc. v. Hardin Constr. Co., 426 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1107 (E.D.
Cal. 2006) (finding the rationale in ProCD II “compelling” and recognizing that where a consumer had
notice of an end user license agreement and an opportunity to return the software if he did not agree to
the terms, the agreement is not “rendered invalid” solely because the consumer did not receive the
agreement before opening the package); Chandler v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 358 F. Supp. 2d 701,
704 (S.D. Ill. 2005) (“By using her phone rather than canceling immediately, or no later than thirty
days after her activation date, Chandler accepted the offered services and the terms and conditions
under which they were offered. She had a clear mechanism and reasonable opportunity to reject
them.”); Davidson & Assocs. v. Internet Gateway, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1178 (E.D. Mo. 2004)
(“[T]he defendants had sufficient notice of the EULAs and TOU. It is true that the terms of the EULAs
and TOU were not on the box, but the terms were disclosed before installation of the games and access
to Battle.net was granted. The defendants also expressly consented to the terms of the EULA and TOU
by clicking ‘I Agree’ and ‘Agree.’ . . . Accordingly, the Court finds that the EULA and TOU are
enforceable contracts under both Missouri or California law.”); O’Quin v. Verizon Wireless, 256 F.
Supp. 2d 512, 515–16 (M.D. La. 2003) (approving of the approach taken in Hill and ProCD); MuddLyman Sales & Serv. Corp. v. United Parcel Serv., 236 F. Supp. 2d 907, 911 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (“The
Court finds that Mudd-Lyman accepted the terms of UPS’s limitation of liability through the breaking
of the shrinkwrap seal and by its on-screen acceptance of the terms of the software license agreement.
Mudd-Lyman was thereby provided with reasonable notice of UPS’s limited liability and was given a
148
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of these courts have failed to analyze why the common understanding of
contract formation should be displaced by the “rolling” contract, and
instead simply cite to the aforementioned cases and adopt their
approach.152
One of the first cases to cite to this duo of cases, Brower v. Gateway
2000 Inc.,153 is emblematic of such an approach. Brower involved a
similar fact pattern as Hill, and the same arbitration clause at issue in
Hill.154 In Brower, a class of consumers had purchased computers and
software products from Gateway either by mail-order or over the phone.155
When the goods arrived, a copy of Gateway’s “Standard Terms and
Conditions Agreement” was found with the product.156 Among other
things, the agreement provided an arbitration clause and stated that, by
fair opportunity to purchase higher liability.”); Bischoff v. DirecTV, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1105
(C.D. Cal. 2002) (finding Hill to be “instructive”); I.Lan Sys., Inc. v. NetScout Serv. Level Corp., 183
F. Supp. 2d 328, 338 (D. Mass. 2002) (agreeing “with those cases embracing the theory of ProCD,”
holding that “clickwrap license agreements are an appropriate way to form contracts,” and determining
that “‘[m]oney now, terms later’ is a practical way to form contracts, especially with purchasers of
software”); Westendorf v. Gateway 2000, Inc., No. 16913, 2000 WL 307369, at *3 (Del. Ch. Mar. 16,
2000) (“The 7th Circuit rejected that argument, however, and found the agreement enforceable as
written. Judge Easterbrook, writing for the unanimous panel, noted ‘[b]y keeping the computer beyond
30 days, the [buyers] accepted Gateway’s offer, including the arbitration clause.’ Undeniably, plaintiff
in the present case retained the computer and accessories for more than thirty days. The same rationale,
therefore, applies to this plaintiff as in the case before the 7th Circuit.” (alteration in original)
(footnotes omitted) (quoting Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150)), aff’d, 763 A.2d 92 (Del. 2000); Rinaldi v. Iomega
Corp., No. 98C-09-064-RRC, 1999 WL 1442014, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 3, 1999) (“Analogous
support for this Court’s conclusion that the physical location of the disclaimer of the implied warranty
of merchantability inside the Zip drive packaging does not make the disclaimer inconspicuous can be
found in some cases from other jurisdictions.”); Stenzel v. Dell, Inc., 870 A.2d 133, 140 (Me. 2005)
(“By accepting delivery of the computers, and then failing to exercise their right to return the
computers as provided by the agreement, Stenzel and Gerber expressly manifested their assent to be
bound by the agreement, including its arbitration clause.”); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 246 A.D.2d
246, 251 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (“While Hill and ProCD, as the IAS Court recognized, are not
controlling (although they are decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit
encompassing the forum State designated for arbitration), we agree with their rationale that, in such
transactions, there is no agreement or contract upon the placement of the order or even upon the receipt
of the goods.”); Levy v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 1997 WL 823611 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 12, 1997) (holding
that section 2-207 did not apply as the contract formed once the plaintiff exercised the opportunity to
accept the goods and accompanying terms); DeFontes v. Dell, Inc., 984 A.2d 1061, 1071 (R.I. 2009)
(“[W]e are satisfied that the ProCD line of cases is better reasoned and more consistent with
contemporary consumer transactions.”); M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d
305, 313 (Wash. 2000) (en banc) (“We find the approach of the ProCD, Hill, and Brower courts
persuasive and adopt it to guide our analysis . . . .”).
152
See, e.g., Mortenson, 998 P.2d at 313 (“We find the approach of the ProCD, Hill, and Brower
courts persuasive and adopt it . . . .”); Brower, 246 A.D.2d at 250–51 (noting that ProCD II and Hill
were applicable); see also Friedman, supra note 28, at 11 (summarizing cases which focus on return
policies rather than notice).
153
246 A.D.2d 246.
154
Id. at 250.
155
Id. at 248.
156
Id.
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keeping the computer beyond thirty days, the consumer would consent to
the terms of the agreement.157 A group of consumers subsequently sued
for breach of warranty and other causes of action related to the goods, and
Gateway moved to dismiss due to the arbitration clause.158 On appeal, the
consumers argued that the clause was not enforceable under U.C.C. section
2-207.159 The court, guided by ProCD and Hill, found that provision
inapplicable. Instead, the court adopted the “rolling contract” approach,
stating:
[W]e agree with [ProCD II and Hill’s] rationale that, in such
transactions, there is no agreement or contract upon the
placement of the order or even upon the receipt of the goods.
By the terms of the Agreement at issue, it is only after the
consumer has affirmatively retained the merchandise for
more than 30 days—within which the consumer has
presumably examined and even used the product(s) and read
the agreement—that the contract has been effectuated.160
However, any mention of why the consumers should be on notice as to
forthcoming terms was noticeably absent from its discussion.161
Furthermore, the decision makes no mention of U.C.C. section 2-206 or
why such orders made over the phone (or by mail) are not offers by the
consumers. Given the analytical flaws in Easterbrook’s analysis, this
failure to even examine the interplay of U.C.C. sections 2-206 and 2-207
and why the basic understanding of contract formation should be dismissed
is troubling.
The subsequent case of M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software
Corp.,162 which also relied upon ProCD and Hill, demonstrates the dangers
of this approach. M.A. Mortenson Company (Mortenson), a general
construction contractor, purchased software from Timberline Software
Corporation (Timberline).163 The software was used to assist in calculating
bids.164 Mortenson had been using Timberline software for approximately
three years when it sought to purchase a newer version of the software and
asked for a price quote.165 Upon receiving the quote, Mortenson placed a
157

Id.
Id. at 248–49.
159
Id. at 249.
160
Id. at 251.
161
See Friedman, supra note 28, at 11 n.63 (citing Brower as an example of a case in which the
court followed Hill’s rationale without considering whether the buyer received any notice that
additional terms would be included post-purchase).
162
998 P.2d 305 (Wash. 2000) (en banc).
163
Id. at 307. Mortenson actually purchased the software from a licensed dealer of Timberline’s,
Softworks Data Systems, Inc.; however, the opinion focuses on Timberline. Id.
164
Id.
165
Id.
158
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purchase order, which detailed price, quantity, credits to be given for past
purchases, software support, notice that any changes in the goods or costs
needed prior approval, and a request to be notified promptly if shipping
could not occur as detailed.166 In response to the order, Timberline sent the
software, which came packaged with a license agreement as well as a
limitation on consequential damages.167 The license advised that if the
buyer did not agree to the terms, it should promptly return the programs for
a full refund.168 Mortenson proceeded to use the software to calculate a
bid, but due to a glitch in the software, Mortenson underbid a project—
which it was awarded—by $1.95 million.169 Mortenson sued, and
Timberline moved for summary judgment based on the consequential
damages limitation found in the licensing agreement. Timberline’s motion
was granted and upheld by the court of appeals.170
On appeal to the Washington Supreme Court, Mortenson argued that
the consequential damage limitation was barred under U.C.C. section 2207(2) as a material alteration to the contract.171 The court dismissed the
applicability of section 2-207 as it found the contract was not formed until
Mortenson had assented to the license agreement.172 The court thus
avoided any discussion of U.C.C. section 2-206, and instead decided the
case under the broad language of section 2-204 and rolling contract
theory.173 This failure to address why Mortenson’s purchase order was not
an offer leaves one with the notion that all a vendor needs to do to apply its
terms is to ship favorable contract terms after the purchase and grant an
opportunity for the buyer to reject them—a result which harkens back to
the “last-shot” doctrine that U.C.C. section 2-207 was meant to address.174
The rolling contract theory does have its limits. For instance, a
consistent theme in rolling contract cases is the right of the buyer to return
the goods should the buyer not agree to the terms presented. This is really
no more than the concept that an offeree is free to accept or reject an offer.
166

Id. at 307–08.
Id. at 308.
168
Id.
169
Id. at 309.
170
Id. at 309–10.
171
Id. at 311.
172
Id. at 313 (citing ProCD II, Hill, and Brower). Mortenson attempted to apply Step-Saver,
which followed the more traditional approach to contract formation. Id. at 311–12. Interestingly, in
distinguishing the case before it from Step-Saver, the court noted that Mortenson and Timberline had
utilized a license agreement throughout their prior relationship. Id. at 312. Had the court’s majority
bothered to conduct such an analysis, this fact could have been persuasive in determining why the
initial purchase order was not the offer under section 2-206.
173
Id. at 312–13.
174
See John E. Murray, Jr., The Chaos of the “Battle of the Forms”: Solutions, 39 VAND. L. REV.
1307, 1331 (1986) (“[Section 2-207’s] purpose was to alter the ‘matching acceptance’ rule, which
oppressed the offeror under the ‘last shot’ principle.”).
167
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Furthermore, the consequences of keeping the product must be made clear
to the buyer. As the court in DeFontes v. Dell, Inc.175—a case involving
Dell’s ability to compel arbitration through its rolling contract standard
terms176—stated:
Yet in adopting the so-called “layered contracting” theory of
formation, we reiterate that the burden falls squarely on the
seller to show that the buyer has accepted the seller’s terms
after delivery. Thus, the crucial question in this case is
whether defendants reasonably invited acceptance by making
clear in the terms and conditions agreement that (1) by
accepting defendants’ product the consumer was accepting
the terms and conditions contained within and (2) the
consumer could reject the terms and conditions by returning
the product.177
The court concluded that the failure to inform the purchasers how to reject
the offer prevented the terms from taking effect.178
Finally, rolling contracts are still vulnerable to the other doctrines of
contract voidability, such as unconscionability.179 Thus, in the Brower
case, though the court held the contract was formed on a rolling contract
theory, it nonetheless reformed the arbitration clause at issue as being
substantively unconscionable.180
C. Criticisms and Critiques of the Rolling Contract Approach
While some courts eagerly embraced the “rolling contract” theory,181 a
number of courts have declined an invitation to depart from the traditional
contract formation paradigm.182 In Klocek v. Gateway, Inc.,183 the United
175

984 A.2d 1061 (R.I. 2009).
Id. at 1063.
177
Id. at 1071 (footnote omitted).
178
Id. at 1073.
179
One commentator has argued that unconscionability should be sufficient ground to deal with
rolling contract law, and that focusing on the timing of contract formation “yields little fruit.” Hillman,
supra note 13, at 744–45. To the degree that current attitudes in the law regarding unconscionability
render it an ineffective defense, Hillman simply asserts that these concerns should be taken up with
lawmakers. Id. at 757.
180
Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 246 A.D.2d 246, 254–56 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998). The clause at
issue in Brower required arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce, which was cost
prohibitive to the normal consumer. Id. at 254–55. Thus, the court found that provision of the
arbitration agreement unconscionable and remanded to determine a more appropriate arbitrator. Id. at
255–56.
181
See, e.g., Meridian Project Sys. v. Hardin Constr. Co., 426 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1107 (E.D. Cal.
2006) (finding the rationale in ProCD II “compelling”).
182
See, e.g., Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1339 (D. Kan. 2000) (“The Court is
not persuaded that Kansas or Missouri courts would follow the Seventh Circuit reasoning in Hill and
ProCD.”).
176
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States District Court for the District of Kansas was faced with the now
familiar fact-pattern: a consumer who received terms and conditions after
purchasing a Gateway computer.184 In response to the consumer’s lawsuit,
Gateway moved to dismiss under an arbitration clause found in the laterrevealed terms, and urged the district court to follow the precedent
established in Hill.185 The court declined to do so, however, by first noting
that the Seventh Circuit’s conclusion regarding the inapplicability of
U.C.C. section 2-207 was “not supported by the statute or by Kansas or
Missouri law.”186 The court then refuted Judge Easterbrook’s assertion
that the “vendor is the master of the offer,”187 and explained:
In typical consumer transactions, the purchaser is the offeror,
and the vendor is the offeree. While it is possible for the
vendor to be the offeror, Gateway provides no factual
evidence which would support such a finding in this case.
The Court therefore assumes for purposes of the motion to
dismiss that plaintiff offered to purchase the computer (either
in person or through catalog order) and that Gateway
accepted plaintiff’s offer (either by completing the sales
transaction in person or by agreeing to ship and/or shipping
the computer to plaintiff).188
As section 2-207 was applicable, the court refused to enforce the
arbitration clause because it was not a part of the original contract, and the
consumer did not expressly agree to the new terms.189
The Klocek court is not alone in declining to adopt the “rolling
contract” approach or in pointing out the doctrinal disconnect of
Easterbrook’s analysis. A number of other courts have similarly either
declined to follow or distinguished ProCD II and Hill.190 Furthermore,
183

Id. at 1334–35.
Id. at 1334.
185
Id. at 1334, 1338.
186
Id. at 1339.
187
See id. at 1340 (quoting ProCD II, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996)).
188
Id. (citations omitted).
189
Id. at 1341.
190
See Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., No. 3:10-CV-957 JCH, 2011 WL 797505, at *3–4 (D. Conn.
Feb. 24, 2011) (determining that enrolling in a program online, paying monthly fees, and receiving
terms and conditions by email did not constitute assent to such terms as the contract was already
formed before the consumers received the email), aff’d, 697 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2012); Ben-Trei
Overseas, L.L.C. v. Gerdau Ameristeel US, Inc., No. 09-CV-153-TCK-TLW, 2010 WL 582205, at *6–
7 (N.D. Okla. Feb. 10, 2010) (finding that a forum selection clause was an additional term, governed by
U.C.C. section 2-207, rather than an implied term in line with the parties’ course of dealing); Triad Int’l
Maint. Corp. v. Aim Aviation, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 2d 666, 670 n.2 (M.D.N.C. 2006) (stating that a
forum selection clause found on the back of an acknowledgement form may not be a part of the
contract under U.C.C. section 2-207); Wachter Mgmt. Co. v. Dexter & Chaney, Inc., 144 P.3d 747, 752
(Kan. 2006) (rejecting an argument that a consumer “expressly consented to the shrinkwrap agreement
184
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numerous commentators have criticized the rolling contract approach on
various grounds, such as the doctrinal analysis,191 the economic
assumptions it makes,192 the norms it stands for,193 moral grounds,194 and
fairness.195 However, the rolling contract theory certainly has its appealing
side with regard to efficiency, and too strict an adherence to traditional
contract formation could obstruct freedom of contract. In response to these
various concerns, commentators have suggested solutions that would
address fairness and efficiency by increasing the notice requirements so
that consumers can be aware of the terms’ existence ex ante.196
Recognizing that sellers need to have flexibility in deferring some
when it installed and used the software rather than returning it” by reasoning that “continuing with the
contract after receiving a writing with additional or different terms is not sufficient to establish express
consent to the additional or different terms”); Licitra v. Gateway, Inc., 734 N.Y.S.2d 389, 393 (N.Y.
Civ. Ct. 2001) (holding that even though the buyer chose to retain the computer, the terms should not
be enforced because of the “‘take it or leave it’ situation,” including non-negotiable terms and no
mechanism through which the customer would be able to question the terms); Rogers v. Dell Computer
Corp., 138 P.3d 826, 834 (Okla. 2005) (“Section 2-207 and other provisions of the U.C.C. apply to the
contracts here and apply to terms which Dell can show were enclosed with the invoice, with the
acknowledgment, or in the package containing the purchased product.”); Lively v. IJAM, Inc., 114 P.3d
487, 492–93 (Okla. Civ. App. 2005) (conducting its analysis under section 2-207, deciding there was
insufficient evidence to determine whether the plaintiff was a merchant, and finding that the plaintiff
was not bound by the forum selection clause as it materially altered the contract).
191
See Bern, supra note 7, at 642–43 n.5 (collecting criticisms); Shubha Ghosh, Where’s the
Sense in Hill v. Gateway 2000?: Reflections on the Visible Hand of Norm Creation, 16 TOURO L. REV.
1125, 1134 (2000) (“Even though Judge Easterbrook concludes that § 2-207 is inapplicable because the
provision governs the situation when there are two opposing forms from the offeror and the offeree, not
one as in the Gateway 2000 case, this view has been expressly rejected.”); Hillman, supra note 13, at
753 (“Easterbrook was plainly wrong about section 2-207’s applicability. Nothing in the text of the
section limits it to transactions involving more than one form.”); Murray, supra note 8, at 47–48
(“Either this highly sophisticated court did not understand the contract formation sections of the
U.C.C., or it chose to ignore them.”).
192
See Bern, supra note 7, at 716–18 (characterizing Easterbrook’s “Terms Later” approach as
ignorant of human nature and economic reality); Ghosh, supra note 191, at 1139 (questioning the
assumption that the terms in rolling contracts are efficient).
193
See Ghosh, supra note 191, at 1129 (arguing that Judge Easterbrook’s opinion amounts to
creating a norm to govern situations similar to Hill).
194
See Bern, supra note 7, at 641–44, 742–53 (arguing Judge Easterbrook’s opinion lacks “moral
sanction”).
195
See id. at 643–44 (“[N]otwithstanding Easterbrook’s window dressing of economics, a rule
sanctioning ‘terms later’ contracting increases . . . distributional unfairness by systematically
redistributing wealth from consumers to vendors.”); Jean Braucher, Commentary, Amended Article 2
and the Decision to Trust the Courts: The Case Against Enforcing Delayed Mass-Market Terms,
Especially for Software, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 753, 757 (referring to rolling contracts as “steamrolling,”
because they attempt to pile on undesirable terms).
196
See Friedman, supra note 28, at 2 (“I propose a mechanism that will ensure that sellers
continue to have needed flexibility to defer some contract terms, but that will also protect purchasers
against the unfair imposition of unexpected and important contract terms arriving at a time when
purchasers are very unlikely to read or act on them.”); Murray, supra note 8, at 77 (“There is neither
unreasonable surprise nor oppression in binding a buyer to conscionable terms arriving inside a box, if
the buyer has been sufficiently alerted to expect such terms, the buyer has ample time to digest them,
and they may be rejected within a reasonable time.”).
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terms, but also recognizing the potential for abuse of such practices,
Professor Stephen Friedman proposes utilizing “template notice” as an
intermediate solution.197 Upon reviewing ProCD and Hill, Friedman
concludes that notice of additional terms is a key element of Easterbrook’s
analysis in each opinion, even if it is rather easily met.198 Subsequent
decisions have failed to give proper attention to the need to give buyers
notice that additional terms are forthcoming.199 Therefore, Friedman
proposes that all sellers be required to provide a “template notice” that:
[P]rovide[s] the following vital information before or during
purchase or order: a brief and clear list or summary of
important terms being deferred (but not the full text), a
statement that the buyer will have the right to reject the terms
and avoid the transaction, and a description of how to
exercise that right.200
Such notice would permit buyers to be aware of the consequences of their
purchase and the existence of additional terms without requiring sellers to
provide those terms on the box itself. This allows the purchaser to be
aware of the terms when the purchaser is most focused on the transaction
while also limiting the scope of terms that are agreed to through the initial
nominal assent.201
One of the weaknesses of the “template notice” approach, as noted by
Professor John Murray, is that summaries of the terms, even if not given in
detail, still face the obstacles that ProCD II and Hill sought to avoid, i.e.,
requiring unrealistic disclaimers that would not fit on a box or that would
be too burdensome for a store clerk to handle.202 Furthermore, the
adequacy of the summaries would be predictable litigation issues.203
Instead, Murray suggests that all that should be required is a conspicuous
notice that additional contract terms are inside the package.204 Murray’s
suggested language is: “[R]ead the important contract terms inside this
package. If you are not satisfied with these contract terms, return the
product for a full refund of the purchase price.”205 This model, according
to Murray, would create a contract at the time the buyer purchases the item
in the store, but subject to the condition of reading and agreeing to the
197

Friedman, supra note 28, at 2–4, 13–14.
See id. at 10 (“Although the notice in ProCD and Hill may have been weak, at least it came
before purchase or order.”).
199
Id. at 10–12.
200
Id. at 2–4.
201
Id. at 29.
202
Murray, supra note 8, at 77.
203
Id.
204
Id. at 77–78.
205
Id.
198
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206

terms inside the box.
Professor Murray’s proposal is an attractive one, but it is not without
its own faults. First, neither Murray nor Friedman fully explain how their
increased disclosure models avoid the application of U.C.C. section 2-207
(though Murray asserts that it does).207 According to Murray, the
placement of a statement on the package indicating that the contract is
subject to a condition solves the problem.208 Presumably, what is meant
here is that when a buyer brings a product with such a disclaimer up to the
counter, the buyer is making an offer with the condition listed on the
product, which the vendor accepts. Thus, section 2-207 would have no
application because no additional terms are ever introduced.209 This
rationale is not entirely convincing as an explanation of how courts would
treat such matters.210 Recall that the district court in ProCD found that the
206
Id. at 78. Professor Murray suggests that the same result can be achieved over the phone
through a verbal advisement to the same effect. Id. at 79.
207
See id. (“Under this analysis, section 2-207 would have no application unless there was either
no statement on the package or the statement was inconspicuous.”).
208
Id. at 78–79. Murray posits that, in a phone order, an oral warning that terms are coming
creates a counter-offer for a conditional contract that the buyer would accept if he or she moved
forward with the contract. Id. at 79. This view assumes a court would not view the follow-up terms as
a confirmation of an oral agreement. Alternatively, the Murray approach could be viewed as giving
rise to a preliminary agreement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 27 (1981)
(“Manifestations of assent that are in themselves sufficient to conclude a contract will not be prevented
from so operating by the fact that the parties also manifest an intention to prepare and adopt a written
memorial thereof; but the circumstances may show that the agreements are preliminary negotiations.”).
As it is not fully enforceable yet, this must envision a preliminary type II agreement, which could
obligate the parties to negotiate further terms in good faith. However, as no further negotiations are
envisioned, it does not seem to be an ideal fit for the fact scenario.
209
See U.C.C. § 2-207 (2011) (applying to contracts that have “Additional Terms in Acceptance
or Confirmation”).
210
See Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc. v. Ottawa Plant Food, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1046–49
(N.D. Iowa 2003) (holding that a clause which limited resale of corn seed product that was posted on
the packaging label was enforceable under section 2-207); Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 249 F. Supp. 2d
746, 754 (N.D. Miss. 2001) (applying section 2-207(2) to a license that was received post-purchase),
amended by 342 F. Supp. 2d 568 (N.D. Miss. 2004), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 459 F.3d 1328 (Fed.
Cir. 2006); cf. Album Graphics, Inc. v. Beatrice Foods Co., 408 N.E.2d 1041, 1048 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)
(applying section 2-207 when a buyer orally ordered an adhesive and in response, seller sent adhesive
with additional written terms, but seller admitted such terms were part of a confirmatory memoranda).
The Murray proposal also raises the possibility that the in-store contract is nothing more than a
preliminary agreement, which may itself be subject to scrutiny. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 26 (“A manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain is not an offer if the person to
whom it is addressed knows or has reason to know that the person making it does not intend to
conclude a bargain until he has made a further manifestation of assent.”). If the effect of the notice
language is that a contract is formed subject to acceptance of additional terms to be viewed later, it can
be argued that no contract has been formed at that point at all. See id. § 21 cmt. b (“Agreement not to
be legally bound. Parties to what would otherwise be a bargain and a contract sometimes agree that
their legal relations are not to be affected. In the absence of any invalidating cause, such a term is
respected by the law like any other term, but such an agreement may present difficult questions of
interpretation: it may mean that no bargain has been reached, or that a particular manifestation of
intention is not a promise; it may reserve a power to revoke or terminate a promise under certain
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contract was subject to section 2-207 despite the presence of a clause on
the product itself.211 Furthermore, this assumes that the buyer is actually
making such an offer. What may be more likely is that the buyer simply
believes that he or she is entering into an agreement to buy the product at a
set price and nothing more.212
This reluctance to consider the context and nature of the transaction is
no small matter. If all a vendor needs to do is place a warning label on its
products that additional terms are coming, every product will easily be
subject to a rolling contract approach and section 2-207 will become a dead
letter as applied to consumers. But that is not to say such labels are
irrelevant either. Certainly, fairness dictates that a buyer should be
permitted to know that additional terms may apply and are forthcoming
prior to engaging in the transaction. Such notice permits the buyer to
engage, if necessary, in additional inquiry as to the terms. The problem
with the Murray and Friedman approaches are that they put an emphasis on
packaging disclosures, but do not take into account context.
Having determined that a blind adherence to rolling contract theory
ignores doctrine and is potentially abusive, it is tempting to simply reject
the theory. However, to do so would ignore the perceived benefits such
standard form contracting may offer. A middle ground is preferable, and
though Professor Murray’s approach offers a workable and perhaps
efficient solution to the doctrinal and fairness problems rolling contracts
raise, a more nuanced approach that takes into account context could offer
a workable solution as well. The remainder of this Article explains how
contract formation informed by both a legal realist approach and relational
contract approach may provide courts the flexibility needed to address a
number of situations moving forward without having to re-write the U.C.C.

circumstances but not others. In a written document prepared by one party it may raise a question of
misrepresentation or mistake or overreaching; to avoid such questions it may be read against the party
who prepared it.” (second emphasis added)).
211
ProCD I, 908 F. Supp. 640, 652–55 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (analyzing and applying section 2-207),
rev’d, ProCD II, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
212
Friedman himself noted this danger, stating:
Whether or not the contract is technically consummated at purchase or order, the
buyer is most fully focused on the transaction at that point. To consider which terms
may be deferred without reference to the circumstances of the purchase, as though
the purchase and deferral of terms are independent of one another, is not
appropriate.
Friedman, supra note 28, at 26; cf. Licitra v. Gateway, Inc., 734 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390–92 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
2001) (interpreting “cash now, terms later” transactions as meaning that “a contract has been formed
with the price, the equipment and time of delivery agreed to, but almost nothing else” and any
subsequent terms “should not be enforced merely because the consumer retains the equipment for 30
days after receipt”).
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IV. REHABILITATING THE “ROLLING CONTRACT”
Before addressing how this approach to contract formation would
work, it is useful to take a moment to explain how rolling contracts can
exist without implicating section 2-207. One of the doctrinal blunders
from ProCD II and Hill that has been decried repeatedly is the statement
that section 2-207 does not apply to situations involving only one form.213
This is blatantly wrong. Though section 2-207 can apply to a true battle of
the forms situation, it can also apply to oral contracts with a single written
confirmation.214 However, it is understandable why Easterbrook would
want to avoid application of section 2-207.
If section 2-207 did apply, then the Hill case would likely have come
down differently. The contract formed over the phone would be the
contract, and the terms that followed would be additional terms in a
confirmation that, as consumers, the Hills could ignore. ProCD II may
have been a closer call if Matthew Zeidenberg were a merchant (which
Easterbrook denied in Hill), as the license agreement would turn on section
2-207(2)(b) and whether it materially altered the contract.215 Indeed, the
case could have been decided in ProCD’s favor on this ground, but this
outcome would deny Easterbrook the ability to put forth the rolling
contract theory. Thus, application of section 2-207 was likely seen as a
danger to future application of the theory (and to the perceived economic
efficiencies that Easterbrook espoused).
However, Easterbrook may have been right, but not for the reason he
articulated. Easterbrook makes it clear that the offer comes not in the
store, but when the product goes home.216 To Easterbrook, the offer is the
writing that comes in the package, which the buyer accepts by
performance.217 If this is indeed the offer, then Easterbrook is correct in
saying section 2-207 does not apply. The reason this is true is that section

213
See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Plaintiffs tell us that
ProCD came out as it did only because Zeidenberg was a ‘merchant’ and the terms inside ProCD’s box
were not excluded by the ‘unless’ clause. This argument pays scant attention to the opinion in ProCD,
which concluded that, when there is only one form, ‘sec. 2-207 is irrelevant.’” (quoting ProCD II, 86
F.3d at 1452)); ProCD II, 86 F.3d at 1452 (“Our case has only one form; U.C.C. § 2-207 is
irrelevant.”).
214
See W. Indus., Inc. v. Newcor Can. Ltd., 739 F.2d 1198, 1205 (7th Cir. 1984) (“Newcor’s
formal written quotation was merely a written confirmation, which under the UCC could not alter the
oral contract materially.” (citing U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(b) (1978))).
215
See U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(b) (2011) (“Between merchants [additional] terms become part of the
contract unless . . . they materially alter it.”).
216
See ProCD II, 86 F.3d at 1452–53 (pointing out that Zeidenberg had an opportunity to review
the license terms before using the software).
217
See id. (“Zeidenberg inspected the package, tried out the software, learned of the license, and
did not reject the goods.”).
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2-207 does not apply to a written offer with acceptance by performance.218
Instead, section 2-206 would be the most relevant statute (ironically one
which Easterbrook did not discuss) and the vendor’s offer could be
accepted “[u]nless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language or
circumstances . . . in any manner and by any medium reasonable in the
circumstances.”219
So this turns the real question about rolling contracts into one of
formulation of the offer. Is the offer made in the store by the buyer, as
traditional contract law would treat the situation, or is the offer deferred?
V. A LEGAL REALISM/RELATIONAL CONTRACT APPROACH TO OFFER
Having identified the conceptual base of the doctrinal problem, all that
remains is to form a framework that solves the riddle of “when is the offer
made?” Legal realism, the theory underlying much of the U.C.C. and the
Restatement, provides a good starting point, but rolling contract theory
may actually be served, perhaps surprisingly, by the insights provided by
relational contract theory. Applying legal realism—as informed by
relational contract theory’s view of contracts as lying on a spectrum, from
near-discrete contracts to contracts with complex and ongoing
obligations—permits courts the flexibility to determine when it is proper to
place the offer in the store or to defer the offer. Such an approach can
explain the ProCD II and Hill decisions without having to distort the
U.C.C. However, such an approach should be applied cautiously and with
a number of limiting caveats, which are sometimes ignored by courts.
A. Legal Realism and Contract Law
Legal realism is largely associated with the work of Arthur Linton
Corbin and his student Karl Llewellyn.220 This approach to law is
popularly characterized as rejecting the rigidity of classical contract law.221
Instead, legal realism proposed to look at contracts within the context of

218
See U.C.C. § 2-207 (applying only to contracts that have “Additional Terms in Acceptance or
Confirmation”); cf. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
PRACTITIONER TREATISE SERIES 63 (5th ed. 2006) (noting that section 2-207 has no application to a
situation in which a written acceptance is silent as to additional terms of a buyer’s written offer).
219
U.C.C. § 2-206.
220
See Scott D. Gerber, Corbin and Fuller’s Cases on Contracts (1942?): The Casebook that
Never Was, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 595, 599 (2003) (describing Corbin as “one of the original legal
realists”); Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 768 (2002) (noting Professor Karl Llewellyn’s focus on contract law during the
legal realism movement).
221
See Franklin G. Snyder, Clouds of Mystery: Dispelling the Realist Rhetoric of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 11, 14 (“[Llewellyn] wanted to replace . . . the rough-and-tumble
hard bargaining of classical capitalism.”).
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222

the facts of the individual case being decided.
To the realists, contract
law was not, and should not be, a cold mechanical application of formal
rules with little regard for the context within which the contract was made.
This influence, via Llewellyn, was carried through into the drafting of
the modern U.C.C. and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.223
Specifically, in the U.C.C., Llewellyn sought to bring contract law into line
with business practices and customs as they operated in real life.224 This
influence can be seen in provisions such as section 2-202, which permits
consideration of parol evidence such as course of performance, course of
dealing, or usage of trade even in a fully integrated contract.225 Similarly,
section 2-208 of the U.C.C. and section 203 of the Restatement advise that
course of performance, course of dealing, and trade usage should be used
in determining the meaning of a contract.226 Section 2-204, which was
cited approvingly in ProCD II,227 permits a contract to be enforceable—
even if there are terms left open and even if the exact moment of its
making is undetermined—as long as the parties intended to make a
contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving a remedy.228
Section 2-206(1)(b) and the “battle of the forms” provision, section 2-207,
both discussed in Part II, were also seen as enabling courts to apply a set of
laws that better reflected the true business practices of the parties involved.
As Frank Snyder has summarized, “[t]he point of the new rules, then, was
to replace the tired old technicalities of the Formalist era with new rules
that would better fit modern commercial practice.”229
The U.C.C. also incorporated a number of provisions with an eye
toward interactions between consumers and merchants. Section 2-207
applies to both consumers and merchants and presumes additional terms

222

Murray, supra note 18, at 891.
See id. at 878–79 (“Corbin . . . rejected monistic rules and provided a foundation for a modern
and realistic contracts jurisprudence. . . . The genuine ‘wholly different conception’ of contract law,
however, occurred a half century ago with the introduction of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, created by Llewellyn, who had been Corbinized by his teacher.”).
224
Knapp, supra note 220, at 768.
225
U.C.C. § 2-202 (2011).
226
Id. § 2-208; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203 (1981).
227
See supra text accompanying notes 125–26.
228
U.C.C. § 2-204; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 22(2) (“A manifestation
of mutual assent may be made even though neither offer nor acceptance can be identified and even
though the moment of formation cannot be determined.”).
229
Snyder, supra note 221, at 23. Professor Snyder actually makes a compelling case in his
article that Llewellyn’s U.C.C., in fact, does not reflect legal realism, but rather Llewellyn’s own
personal value norms. See id. at 13 (“[A] look at what Llewellyn actually wrought suggests that, for
him, the proper relationship between theory and doctrine is to use whichever one gives him the result
he wants in a given situation.”). Snyder refers to the legal realism that is purported to be influencing
the U.C.C. as “Pop Realism.” Id. at 19.
223
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are not a part of contracts formed under section 2-207(1).
But perhaps
the most consumer-oriented provision incorporated into both the U.C.C.
and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts is the unconscionability
provision.231 Worded in nearly identical terms, these provisions permit
reviewing courts to void or reform contract provisions that are viewed as
The unconscionability
unconscionable under the circumstances.232
determination, in line with the legal realists’ call for consideration of
context, is to be made in light of the surrounding circumstances.233 The
test for unconscionability under the comments to the U.C.C. reads as
follows:
[W]hether, in the light of the general commercial background
and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the
clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable
under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of
the contract. . . . The principle is one of the prevention of
oppression and unfair surprise and not of disturbance of
allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power.234
Most courts apply Professor Arthur Leff’s framework, which provides
that unconscionability can be either procedural or substantive, with many
courts requiring a showing of both.235 A number of courts have applied
unconscionability doctrine to boilerplate terms, such as those found in a
rolling contract, and granted relief to plaintiffs under this provision.
Though boilerplate is often dealt with under the unconscionabilty
provisions, the Restatement addresses the subject head-on. Section 211
states:
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (3), where a party to an
agreement signs or otherwise manifests assent to a writing
and has reason to believe that like writings are regularly used
to embody terms of agreements of the same type, he adopts
the writing as an integrated agreement with respect to the
terms included in the writing.
230
See U.C.C. § 2-207 (“[A]dditional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the
contract.”).
231
Id. § 2-302; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208. Unconscionability is not
necessarily limited to consumers, but consumers are generally more likely to benefit from these
provisions than merchants.
232
U.C.C. § 2-302 & cmt. 1; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 208 & cmt. a.
233
U.C.C. § 2-302(2) & cmt. 1; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 & cmt. a; see
Murray, supra note 18, at 887–89 (“[Llewellyn] designed [the unconscionability provision] exclusively
as a device that would empower courts to assure a more precise and fair determination of the factual
bargain.”).
234
U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (citation omitted).
235
See Arthur Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. PA. L.
REV. 485, 488 (1967) (discussing procedural and substantive unconscionability).
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(2) Such a writing is interpreted wherever reasonable as
treating alike all those similarly situated, without regard to
their knowledge or understanding of the standard terms of the
writing.
(3) Where the other party has reason to believe that the party
manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew that the
writing contained a particular term, the term is not part of the
agreement.236
This provision acknowledges the problem of standard term agreements and
assent and applies a type of “blanket assent” to all such terms in the
writing, subject to the caveat listed in subsection three.237
Comment f to section 211 clarifies that “[a]lthough customers typically
adhere to standardized agreements and are bound by them without even
appearing to know the standard terms in detail, they are not bound to
unknown terms which are beyond the range of reasonable expectation.”238
Interestingly, the comments also address a situation common in rolling
contracts—terms appearing on instructions of use and the like. Comment d
states:
The same document may serve both contractual and other
purposes, and a party may assent to it for other purposes
without understanding that it embodies contract terms. He
may nevertheless be bound if he has reason to know that it is
used to embody contract terms.
Insurance policies,
steamship tickets, bills of lading, and warehouse receipts are
commonly so obviously contractual in form as to give the
customer reason to know their character. But baggage
checks or automobile parking lot tickets may appear to be
mere identification tokens, and a party without knowledge or
reason to know that the token purports to be a contract is then
not bound by terms printed on the token. Documents such as
invoices, instructions for use, and the like, delivered after a
contract is made, may raise similar problems.239
The comment advises that the individual’s situation, as viewed through
objective reasonableness or subjective knowledge, should be taken into
account. Thus, as with unconscionability, Llewellyn’s legal realism calls
236

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211.
Id. § 211 cmt. c; LLEWELLYN, supra note 13, at 370; see also Hillman, supra note 13, at 750
(“Llewellyn’s conception of ‘blanket assent’ is better read to mean only that, despite failing to read
form contracts, users comprehend the existence of standard terms and agree to bind themselves to them,
provided the terms are not unreasonable.”).
238
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. f.
239
Id. § 211 cmt. d (emphasis added).
237
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for consideration of the context of the contract.
B. Relational Contract Theory
Relational contract theory is the life’s work of Professor Ian R.
Macneil.240
Under Macneil’s view of contract law, contracts are
relationships and not discrete, isolated interactions.241 In one of his latest
works, Macneil summarized relational contract theory as having four core
propositions:
First, every transaction is embedded in complex relations.
Second,
understanding
any
transaction
requires
understanding all essential elements of its enveloping
relations.
Third, effective analysis of any transaction requires
recognition and consideration of all essential elements of its
enveloping relations that might affect the transaction
significantly.
Fourth, combined contextual analysis of relations and
transactions is more efficient and produces a more complete
and sure final analytical product than does commencing with
non-contextual analysis of transactions.242
With this focus on relationships, relational contract theory rejects
classic formulations of offer and acceptance as inaccurate.243 Stewart
Macaulay has recounted an analogy to explain the relational approach:
Often, however, in a long-term continuing relationship, the
situation resembles a rheostat. As more and more power is
sent to the bulb, we get more and more light. It is hard to say
when the light has been turned on. On and off are not useful
terms. Similarly, in a relational contract often it is hard to
say when the contract is formed. Moreover, it is not likely to
be formed once and for all.244
An important aspect of relational contract theory worth noting is that it
divides contracts into two ends on a spectrum with discrete contracts at one
240

Murray, supra note 18, at 877.
Stewart Macaulay, Relational Contracts Floating on a Sea of Custom? Thoughts About the
Ideas of Ian MacNeil and Lisa Bernstein, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 775, 801 (2000); Macneil, supra note 23,
at 878; Murray, supra note 18, at 877.
242
Macneil, supra note 23, at 881–82 (footnotes omitted).
243
See Macaulay, supra note 241, at 778 (“Macneil . . . points out that our assumed story about
making contracts often fits the facts poorly.” (citing Ian R. Macneil, Restatement (Second) of Contracts
and Presentiation, 60 VA. L. REV. 589 (1974))).
244
Id. (crediting Macneil as the genesis of the analogy).
241
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245

end and relational ones at the other. The discrete describes a simple sale
such as an exchange of goods.246 However, Macneil admits that even
discrete contracts have some relational aspects, so the idea of a purely
discrete contract is a fiction.247 He therefore labels such transactions “asif-discrete.”248 Running from as-if-discrete relations, contracts increase in
complexity to the highly relational. Macneil lists a number of factors to be
considered in determining where a contractual relation should lie on the
spectrum, including the personal relations of the parties; the number of
parties involved; the subject of the exchange; the commencement, duration
and termination of relationship; planning; and future cooperation.249
Perhaps it should come as no surprise that relational contract theory is
critical of the rules formed by the legal realists as mere tweaks to the prior
formalistic regime.250 Macneil has asserted that though neoclassical law
can deal adequately with discrete contracts, when discrete and relational
principles conflict, neoclassical law lacks the resources necessary to deal
adequately with the problem.251 However, while relational contract theory
asserts itself as a stand-alone theory, neoclassicists view the theory as just
a subset of legal realism.252 This Article does not attempt to resolve that
debate, but simply recognizes what relational contract theory could add to
our understanding of offer under a neoclassical framework.
C. A Legal Realism/Relational Approach to Offer
In reviewing the principles of legal realism, it appears that the rules
promulgated were meant to be flexible enough to deal with both changing
and evolving commercial practices. The many provisions cited in both the
U.C.C. and Restatement focus on the context within which the contract
before the court was made. Unfortunately, due to the way the sections
245
Macneil, supra note 23, at 894; see IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN
INQUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 10 (1980) [hereinafter MACNEIL, SOCIAL
CONTRACT] (delineating two types of relational contracts: the primitive community contractual relation
and the modern contractual relation).
246
MACNEIL, SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 245, at 10.
247
Id.; Macneil, supra note 23, at 895.
248
Macneil, supra note 23, at 895.
249
MACNEIL, SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 245, at 13–20. Macneil lists a total of eleven such
factors. These factors were put forth in relation to the primitive community relational contract, but
Macneil later stresses that they are all relevant to the modern contractual relation as well. Id. at 21.
250
See id. at 72–77 (criticizing U.C.C. section 2-207’s failure to address relations); Murray, supra
note 18, at 877 (“Advocates of relational theory assert that the neoclassical school simply absorbs the
theory, pretending that it is neither revolutionary nor radical but simply an extension of neoclassical
truth.”).
251
MACNEIL, SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 245, at 72.
252
Murray, supra note 18, at 877–78; see Melvin A. Eisenberg, Why There Is No Law of
Relational Contracts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 805, 817–20 (2000) (“There can be no special law of
relational contracts, because relational contracts and contracts are virtually one and the same.”).

114

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:73

have been written and the way they have been applied, many situations are
bound to a rather mechanical offer and acceptance model. This presents
problems for the rolling contract, which, as explained in Part IV, needs to
displace the typical offer model if it is to avoid section 2-207 and survive.
Unfortunately, the U.C.C. does not address how to differentiate between
two possible offers, thus creating a problem when our consumer enters a
store, walks up to the counter with a package of software, and pays. The
problem presents just the sort of situation Macneil suggested neoclassical
rules were inadequate to address—a discrete contract with relational
aspects. Therefore, it would appear apropos to utilize the relational
concept of the discrete/relational spectrum as a means of resolving the
issue.
A legal realist view of offer would require an examination of the
circumstances under which the parties transacted. The notice, both on the
package and perhaps elsewhere, would help determine which is the offer.
But a relational approach would further inquire into the nature of the
contract being contemplated. What is the nature of the product? Do the
parties expect to have further interaction? Will the seller provide ongoing
technical support and if so, for how long? Is the buyer aware of such
additional services when the product is bought? Was the transaction part
of a larger negotiation? All of these questions would be relevant in
determining the nature of the transaction.253
At this point, it should be clarified that this is not a relational approach
to offer. Relational theorists would likely cringe at the suggestion that the
approach could be used to support a deferred offer that began the
contractual relationship like a light switch.254 However, under a legal
realism approach to offer that is informed by the relational contract theory,
the nature of the relationship, and whether it is fair that the parties expected
a further communication as the formal offer, is perhaps the best way to
view and justify the rolling contract.255 The more discrete a transaction is,
the more likely it is that the traditional offer and acceptance model should
apply. Transactions that envision ongoing services may very well be
understood to involve more than a simple in-store payment and thus justify
253
MACNEIL, SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 245, at 13–20; see Rogers v. Dell Computer Corp.,
138 P.3d 826, 832 (Okla. 2005) (“In this case, the time of formation of the contracts and their terms
depend on the conversations and circumstances between Dell and the plaintiffs at the time the orders
were placed. If the language and circumstances were such that when the orders were placed, the
contracts were not formed until after the plaintiffs received the ‘Terms and Conditions of Sale’
document, the arbitration provisions would be a term of the contracts. The arbitration provision would
also be a term of the contracts if it were incorporated into them at the time the plaintiffs placed the
orders.”).
254
See Macaulay, supra note 241, at 778 (describing the light switch analogy).
255
See Murray, supra note 18, at 906 (“Ironically, this ‘rolling’ or ‘layered’ contract theory may
be viewed as ‘relational’ though the true relationist would reject any such characterization as
heretical.”).
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delaying the offer.
This is not to say that every sale of goods that has an ongoing
relational aspect is now subject to rolling contract treatment. As the
relationists have admitted, no contract is purely discrete. The fact that
implied warranties may apply should not transform an otherwise discrete
transaction into a relational one. Both parties must also be aware of the
nature of the relationship.256 In this regard, notice, such as described by
either Friedman or Murray, will be highly relevant in analyzing when the
offer occurs.257
To understand how this approach might apply, consider the facts of
ProCD II. Zeidenberg was, in fact, somewhat of a villain.258 He had
purchased software from ProCD before and was aware that the software
would be subject to some sort of license agreement.259 The software
package warned him on the box that the software was subject to a
license.260 He also knew that the software simply permitted him to access
the ProCD database, which was unquestionably in the nature of an ongoing
relationship.261 The contract was, therefore, not a discrete (or as-ifdiscrete) transaction, but one that contemplated an ongoing relationship.
Given the circumstances, it was perfectly reasonable to assume Zeidenberg
knew his in-store purchase was not the end of the deal, but the beginning,
and that contract terms, i.e. the offer, would be forthcoming. Indeed, all of
the examples provided by Easterbrook in his opinion that purport to be in
the nature of rolling contracts (insurance agreements, airline tickets, and
concert tickets) are more than discrete relationships.262
256
Macneil addresses this somewhat in the factor of attitudes. The collection of attitudes of the
parties that the participants have towards the transaction is a relevant factor and takes into account
attitudes regarding conflict of interest, unity, time, and expectations about trouble. MACNEIL, SOCIAL
CONTRACT, supra note 245, at 17–20.
257
See supra Part III.C (presenting Friedman and Murray’s suggestions concerning notice).
258
See James J. White, Contracting Under Amended 2-207, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 723, 741
(“Zeidenberg was surely a naughty fellow who should have his hands slapped.”).
259
ProCD II, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996).
260
Id.
261
Id. at 1449.
262
Id. at 1451. This approach would also help to explain the result in Mortenson, discussed in
Part III.B. In Mortenson, the buyer had been using the seller’s software for three years before
purchasing the updated software at issue. M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d
305, 307 (Wash. 2000) (en banc). There was evidence that Mortenson had been operating under the
license agreement at issue during this time so there was an awareness of the license, even if the
purchase order made no mention of it. Id. at 312. Also, the purchase order at issue had ongoing
relational aspects such as “software support” for an unspecified number of hours, which would have
put both parties on notice that further terms would be forthcoming. Id. at 311. Hill is a more difficult
case to justify, but it can still be resolved under the legal realist/relational approach to offer.
Easterbrook’s references to the ongoing technical support that the purchasers were receiving tends to
lend credence to the transaction being more than a discrete relationship; the failure to give notice on the
box, however, that terms were coming raises questions of whether the buyers would really have known
about the support and warranties. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997)
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D. A Cautious Approach to the Rolling Contract
While this approach may be useful for resolving the issue of
identifying when an offer can be deferred, a cautious approach should be
taken lest every vendor attempt, through boilerplate language and standard
warranties, to turn discrete contracts into relational ones. First, for a sale
of goods, the presumption should be that the basic rule applies and the
offer occurs in-store by the purchaser. It should be up to the vendor to
rebut this presumption, which it can do by showing either that the buyer
subjectively knew that the offer was coming, or, based on the
circumstances, it was objectively reasonable to assume that the offer was
coming.263 It is in this second method that the legal realism/relational
approach will be useful. In assessing reasonableness, courts should
consider the language on the product, such as notices of additional terms,
as well as the nature of the contract contemplated. The closer a transaction
comes to a discrete transaction, the less likely it is that an ongoing
relationship is contemplated by both parties. It may be that in some
circumstances, the nature of the contract contemplated requires little in the
way of product labeling because the contract clearly is not a discrete one.
In other circumstances, the labeling may be of higher importance, as the
ongoing nature of the relationship may not be readily apparent to the
buyer. Either way, the labeling or notice used should not necessarily be
the determining factor, but should be instructive on the nature of the
contractual relationship. Finally, the terms of the deferred offer should be
related to the nature of the ongoing relationship so that the buyer will have
notice of their existence, if not their details, prior to making the purchasing
decision.
Under a rolling contract theory, if the contract offer is deferred, then
the limitations described in Part III.B, should still be followed. The terms
should be conspicuous and should describe how the purchaser can reject
the offer.264 Furthermore, in keeping with section 69 of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, silence or inaction should not be the proscribed

(describing the difference as “functional, not legal”). These issues should have been explored further
under the legal realism/relational approach. See Friedman, supra note 28, at 9 (criticizing the Hill
court’s conclusion regarding the buyers’ ability to obtain the terms ahead of time as “a bit
underwhelming” because of the buyers’ lack of awareness that additional terms existed).
263
See Rogers v. Dell Computer Corp., 138 P.3d 826, 832 (Okla. 2005) (“Under section 2-206(1)
of the U.C.C., the buyer is the offeror, and a contract is formed when an order is placed and the seller
agrees to ship unless the language and circumstances involved in the transaction unambiguously show
otherwise.”).
264
See DeFontes v. Dell, Inc., 984 A.2d 1061, 1071–72 (R.I. 2009) (holding that consumers were
not bound by deferred terms when it was not reasonably apparent that they could reject the terms
simply by returning the goods).
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mode of acceptance, though the simple use of the product should suffice.265
Also, in keeping with section 211 of the Restatement, the deferred offer
should not be incorporated into a user’s manual or the like, but instead
should clearly identify itself as the contract terms.266
Finally, given that the buyer has the product and the vendor has the
buyer’s money before the buyer even gets to realistically see the detailed
terms, such contracts go beyond mere “contracts of adhesion.”267 There is
an added level of procedural gamesmanship when the only way to reject an
offer is to travel back to a store or to pay for shipping the product back.268
To the degree that such rolling contracts engage in this sort of
gamesmanship, courts should not be reluctant to find procedural
unconscionability, thus lessening the burden of the buyer/plaintiff should
the contract also contain onerous terms.269
265
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69 (1981). Section 69 provides that silence or
inaction can only act as an acceptance in specified circumstances, such as when the “offeree takes the
benefit of offered services with reasonable opportunity to reject them and reason to know that they
were offered with the expectation of compensation,” or “an offeree . . . does any act inconsistent with
the offeror’s ownership.” Id. But see Rogers, 138 P.3d at 833 (“The plaintiffs’ accepting the
computers and not returning them is consistent with a contract being formed at the time that the orders
were placed and cannot be construed as acquiescing in the ‘Terms and Conditions of Sale’ document
whether included with the invoice or acknowledgment or with the computer packaging.”); Gillette,
supra note 10, at 681 (“Assent typically reflects some arrangement to which there has been mutual
agreement created by negotiations or conduct more explicit than opening a box or using a product that
is accompanied (unknown to or ignored by the user) by a recitation of obligations.”); White, supra note
258, at 737 (“To say that the offeror is the ‘master of his offer’ means only that he may rule out certain
things as acceptance. That is, he can limit the universe of things that will be regarded as acceptances,
not that he can expand acceptance beyond the universe that a reasonable person in the offeree’s shoes
would believe to be acceptance.”).
266
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 & cmt. d.
267
See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability,
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1265 (2003) (discussing ProCD II and Hill as examples of “situation-specific
monopolies,” in which the sellers can take advantage of the fact that the purchase already occurred not
by raising the price but by providing terms of low quality). Unfortunately, a number of courts that have
adopted the rolling contract approach have been content to simply cite to the widespread use and
efficiency of such deferred terms as well as to rely on the conspicuousness of the terms themselves
rather than on the procedural unconscionability of deferring such terms in the first place. See
Friedman, supra note 28, at 38 (noting that there was no real discussion in Mortenson of whether the
deferral itself was unconscionable). This Article agrees with Professor Friedman that such a limited
analysis is insufficient.
268
White, supra note 258, at 748. Professor White presents a humorous visual to illustrate his
point regarding such deferred offers:

The buyer has received and spent all evening setting up his computer, and he is
sitting in his study in International Falls, Minnesota, in his underwear with a beer
when he has to decide whether to agree to the new terms or go out in the negativethirty-degree temperature and return the computer. This offer is more objectionable
than a predelivery e-mail because it is coercive.
Id.
269
See Friedman, supra note 28, at 35–40 (asserting that, absent template notice, deferred terms
are more susceptible to unconscionability attacks even with only a small degree of substantive
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VI. CONCLUSION
Rolling contracts have indeed become commonplace in many
transactions. However, this does not mean that all such contracts are
sinister or should be abhorred. The ability to read terms later in the
convenience of one’s own home may indeed appeal to a buying consumer.
But caution must be exercised to ensure that the buyer has actually
anticipated such an arrangement. If the buyer has, then a rule that strikes
such contracts down under a mechanical approach to the U.C.C. interferes
with the parties’ expectations and freedom to contract. However, a rule
that upholds rolling contracts, with little regard for the context of the
transaction, similarly defeats freedom of contract by imposing additional
terms upon buyers without considering the bargained exchange that was
expected.
The U.C.C. and the legal realism movement that is at the heart of many
of its provisions should reject such mechanical applications in either
direction. A legal realism/relational approach to when an offer is made
takes into account the context and expectations of the parties. This
approach, coupled with protections, such as conspicuous terms and the
unconscionability doctrine, should ensure a proper balance between the
efficiency of rolling contracts and protection from overreaching by
vendors. Discrete contracts will continue to enjoy a presumption of the
traditional contract formation rules, but will be displaced where
reasonable. This approach gives courts the flexibility to take account for,
and give credence to, the rolling contract without casting aside decades of
contract law or the reasonable expectations of the parties involved.

unconscionability present). Professor James Gibson has advocated a similar approach in which the
entire transaction, from start to finish, should be considered in the procedural unconscionability
analysis. James Gibson, Vertical Boilerplate, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 161, 219–20 (2013). Professor
Gibson found, in an empirical study of contracts in the desktop computer industry, that the average
transaction bound the buyer to twenty-five different contracts totaling 74,897 words. Id. at 190. As
part of a judicial response to such contracts, he urges that “courts must look beyond the four corners of
the contract itself and consider the entire transaction from start to finish with all of its information
costs.” Id. at 219–20. Professor Gibson explains that “[a] term may be unresponsive to market forces,
notwithstanding its prominence, if it arrives after the consumer has invested considerable time in the
purchase (the acquisition cost issue) or has concentrated his or her limited attention on other product
features (the processing cost issue).” Id. at 220.

